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Abstract
In 1998, the world first became aware of the huge impact that landmines were
having upon humanity when the former Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan
and the world saw how much damage landmines were having on the
population.
This study sets out to assess how the global community has set about dealing
with this blight. The United Nations has played a leading role in the formation
of programmes to attempt to ameliorate the situation. Whilst many of these
programmes have removed a significant number of mines and undoubtedly
saved thousands from death and injury, progress has generally been slow and
there is a perception that the process of programme initiation is far from
perfect.

Whilst this may be a fair criticism, the method of programme

development tries to be focussed on capacity development as well as the
clearance and reduction of casualties, which in itself may cause difficulties in
the initiation.
The study analyses the development of two programmes in particular – the
national programmes in Cambodia and Mozambique – and then considers the
influences that culture and organisational structure have had upon those
organisations.
Taking these lessons, the study moves to analyse how the best methods of
implementation could be implemented and recommends a number of areas to
be considered in the development of future mine action organisations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
On the 3rd December 1997, a remarkable treaty was signed by 122 nations in
Ottawa. The treaty was hailed by United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi
Annan as “a landmark step in the history of disarmament” and “a historic victory
for the weak and vulnerable of our world”.iii The Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and On
{sic} Their Destruction1 was developed and negotiated within a 12 month period
and was acknowledged by most to be a remarkable achievementiii. Since the
initiation, some 140 countries have signed or acceded to the treaty, of whom,
118 have ratified, therefore fully committing themselves to all the provisions of
the Anti – Personnel Mine Ban Treaty.iv
The treaty essentially prevents all signatories from using, holding, producing
and transferring all anti – personnel (AP) landmines. It also commits them to
destroying any stockpiles they may hold and to clearing all AP mines on their
territory within a 10-year period of ratification. It is evident that the treaty is
making a significant difference. As the Landmine Monitor states: “A growing
number of governments are joining the Mine Ban Treaty, and {…} there is a
decreased use of antipersonnel landmines, a dramatic drop in production, an
almost complete halt to trade, rapid destruction of stockpiled mines, fewer mine
victims in key affected countries, and more land demined.”v
Whilst the political movements in the anti-landmine2 arena have moved on a
pace, so the concept of clearance and land remediation has also altered in a
significant way. In the last 10 years, the mine clearance industry has
transformed itself from a tough “cowboy” industry, employing “roughnecks” who
would have difficulty finding work outside the sector, to a regulated industry
working to international standards and attempting to achieve the most effective
methods of clearance offering value for money, safety and reliability. Although
1

Throughout this report, the convention will be known by its common name, the “AP Mine Ban Treaty”
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the AP Mine Ban Treaty does not address it, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)
presents an equal threat in socio – economic terms in many countries and must
also be cleared. Throughout this study, the term “mines” refers to both mines
and UXO.
The general public became aware of the humanitarian problems relating to
landmines in 1989 following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. During the
10-year conflict both sides had laid mines – the Mujahadeen to block enemy
deployments and to support ambushes and the Soviets in protective and terror
based tactics. In the very early days of the problem (the early 1990’s), mines
were estimated to be causing between 20 and 25 casualties per day in
Afghanistanvi. This was reduced in mid 2001 to an estimated mere 10-12
casualties per day. Figures since 11th September 2001, when around 4,000
Afghan UN deminers were withdrawn from Afghanistan during the campaign,
are still somewhat sketchy.
In the late 1980s, a number of organisations attempted to ameliorate the
emerging mine problem in Afghanistan although in the aftermath of the Soviet
withdrawal, the situation proved to be frenzied and uncoordinated. The UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) established its first
coordination centre in Afghanistan in 1990 in order to attempt to bring some
order to the chaos. By the end of September 1990, 432 trained deminers were
organised and working in 16 teams throughout Afghanistanvii.
Afghanistan is just one more example of how a great number of actors pulled
together in demanding circumstances requiring a better focus on coordination.
Afghanistan is not considered in detail in this study but is yet another example
of why it is important to focus Mine Action research in this direction.
Aim
The aim of this study is to make recommendations for the better implementation
of a national mine action centre (MAC).
2

The terms “Mine” & “Landmine” throughout this report refer to landmines, Unexploded Ordnance
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Objectives
The objectives of the study are:

• To outline the global landmine problem.
• To describe the structure of the current state of the mine clearance industry
and analyse the modus operandi for the development of a MAC.

• To examine the limitations and problems associated with the current method
of MAC development in order to define the best way of improving it.

• To examine the cultural influences that affect the development of a Mine
Action Programme.

• To assess whether a standardised methodology for implementing a MAC
would be of benefit.

The scope of this study will be bounded by extant limitations. All mine action
activities will be assumed to be humanitarian mine action activities. There are
many definitions of humanitarian mine action, but in this case, it is proposed to
accept the UNs’ definition of mine action as referring to:
‘those activities geared towards addressing the problems faced by
populations as a result of landmine contamination. It is not so much about
mines as it is about people and their interactions with a mine-infested
environment.

Its aim is not technical – to survey, mark and eradicate

landmines – but humanitarian and developmental – to recreate an
environment in which people can live safely, in which economic, social and
health development can occur freely from the constraints imposed by
landmine contamination, and which the victim’s needs are addressed.’ viii
Mine Action is considered to contain the following five elements:
•

“Mine clearance, including survey, mapping, and marking;

Contamination and Booby traps.
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•

Mine awareness and risk reduction education;

•

Victim assistance;

•

Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines

•

Advocacy to stigmatise the use of landmines and support a total ban on
antipersonnel landmines”“ix

It is also worth noting at this stage the UN’s vision as stated in the Strategy
paper for 2001-5
“We envision a world free of the threat of landmines and unexploded
ordnance, where individuals and communities live in a safe environment
conducive to development, and where mine survivors are fully integrated
into their societies.”x
At the moment the UN supports the majority of MACs around the world. The
majority are also funded to a greater extent, through the UN, rather than the
host Government, which has a significant influence on the host nation’s desire
to direct the programme.
Study value
At the moment, the development of a MAC to a country is done on an almost ad
hoc basis, with a host nation asking the UN for support to overcome a
humanitarian problem. The UN will not move without this invitation. Thus far,
the method for structuring and developing a MAC has not been completely
standardised and there are strong arguments that there should not be such a
protocol due to the widely differing cultural influences – what works in South
East Asia may well not work particularly well in Africa. It is one of the objectives
of this study to assess whether such a protocol could prove valuable.
With a standardised methodology, it does however seem probable that
efficiencies could be introduced into the process of design and implementation
of a MAC which would reflect well on the humanitarian community by improving
the value for money spent on mine action activities in a mine affected country.
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Origins of the study
The author of the study spent a number of years in the field as a Technical
Advisor, Programme Manager, and later Senior Technical Advisor in mine
action programmes between the years of 1994 and 1999. During his time in the
field, he became increasingly frustrated at the problems caused by weak
management of the programmes by national staff, poor expatriate advice
offered to those programmes, restricted tied aid and structural difficulties within
national programmes. Much has improved since those formative years, but the
author feels that there is still scope for further more structured improvement.
Methodology
The study will draw on three culturally different countries, and their mine action
structures, all set up under very different circumstances, but with almost
identical aims of ridding their home nations of landmines. The two countries to
be analysed in detail will be Cambodia and Mozambique; the third, Lebanon,
will be outlined initially together with Cambodia and Mozambique and then a
detailed analysis will be made in a later chapter.

Whilst these three mine

affected countries are not the only ones with programmes, given the history that
has affected the development of these programmes, they can be considered to
be representative of the majority of extant MACs.

Both the Cambodia and

Mozambique programmes originated during large UN operations immediately
post conflict and were planned, developed and implemented in a great hurry.
Lebanon will be considered in more detail later in the study to assess whether
previous lessons had been learned. Lebanon is not completely unique and
whilst a number of more recent programmes have had the benefit of a greater
time scale, there are still a large number of programmes, such as the recently
initiated UN programme in Sri Lanka and the recent UN clearance programme
in Kosovo that were all implemented at relatively short notice.
Lessons learned will be drawn from these developments and these will then be
compared with a number of classic organisational models.

The author has

carried out much of the research over recent months in his work in
Mozambique, Cambodia and Lebanon and has closely worked with a number of
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organisations within these countries.

A number of interviews with key

stakeholders were undertaken either by telephone or during the course of visits
to these countries. It is worth noting that because of the relative newness of
Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), there is a paucity of quality literature in the
subject area.
Whilst interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, there was a
requirement to retain some flexibility in order to allow the study to move forward
in the most beneficial direction. Because of the author’s position in the industry,
he was able to access significant data, on both a formal and informal level.
Case Study analysis
During the development of the country studies, a general framework was
developed to give structure to the analysis. A background section gives the
historical and political reasons for the environment the countries find
themselves in.

Following this, a contemporary analysis will assess the

development of the current mine action environment identifying a number of
critical characteristics to highlight unique requirements and will then identify any
key issues arising.
Study Structure
The detailed structure of the study is outlined below:
•

Chapter 1 – Introduction.

•

Chapter 2 – Background to the Global Landmines Situation.

•

Chapter 3 – Literature review. A general review of the available literature
available covering both the mine action sector and Mine Action
Organisational development.

•

Chapter 4 – Detailed analyses of two countries, drawing on the
successes and failures of both and background to Lebanon, a more
recent programme.

•

Chapter 5 – Conclusions from analysis and assessment of best practice
in MACs.
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•

Chapter 6 – Structural implementation.

•

Chapter 7 – Lessons learned in Lebanon.

•

Chapter 8 – Recommendations and Conclusions.

i
ii

UN Secretary - General Kofi Annan, Address to the signing Ceremony of the Antipersonnel Mines
Convention. Ottawa, Canada, 3rd December 1997.
iii
The full text of the AP Mine Ban Treaty can be found at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2001
iv
Landmine Monitor Report 2001, (Human Rights Watch, August 2001)
v
op cit, p 1.
vi
Roberts S & Williams J, After the Guns fall Silent, (Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 1995),
p14.
vii
UNOCHA Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan Workplan 2001
viii
UNMAS paper, Mine action and effective coordination: The United Nations Policy, (A/53/496), 1998
ix
op cit, annex II, para 7
x
UN paper, United Nations Mine Action: A Strategy for 2001-5, Report of the Secretary General, 56th
Session, Agenda item 38, Addendum 1, (A/56/448).
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Chapter 2
Background
Although there is some debate as to when landmines were first used, the
general history can be traced with reasonable certainty. Modern landmines are
explosive traps, but their lineage derives from non-explosive predecessors such
as spikes and stakes used by ancient armies as far back as 2,500 years ago.
One of these devices, the four-spiked caltrop can be closely compared to the
present day landmine in a tactical defensive context and design function. It
comprises four spikes, usually made of iron, joined at the centre and arranged
so that when thrown on the ground, one spike always points upwards with the
other three forming the base. Caltrops were reported to have been used as far
back as the 3rd century BC, and the same design is still being used in present
day conflicts.
Explosives were introduced at a later stage to make use of their inherent
properties in order to improve the killing or wounding capabilities of mines. It is
worth noting that mines are generally designed to maim, rather than to kill and
so increase the physiological effects upon the troops affected.
The earliest explosive-based mines were used in Southern Italy in the 14th
Century, although these were initiated by a powder trail, which was inherently
problematic. In addition, the gunpowder was hygroscopic and therefore could
be rendered inert after just a few days, depending upon the weather.
The first pressure initiated landmine was recorded in 1726 by the German
military historian, H Frieherr von Flemming who described what a fladdermine
(flying mine) looked like: “It consisted of a ceramic container with glass and
metal fragments embedded in the clay containing 0.90 kilos of gunpowder,
buried at a shallow depth in the glacis of a fortress and actuated by someone
stepping on it or touching a low strung wire”.i
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Although noted here in 1726, the concept does not seem to have taken hold
until the American Civil War, when Brigadier-General Gabriel J. Rains ordered
his troops to prepare Artillery Shells so they would explode when stepped upon.
On 4th May 1862, a horseman activated one of these devices and gained the
epithet of being the first person to be killed by a landmine.
The first use of mines on a large scale was during the First World War,
designed to outwit the newly deployed tanks. Further development followed
and during the Second World War, anti-personnel (AP) mines were specifically
designed to prevent enemy soldiers from removing the Anti Tank (AT) mines
that had been employed. By 1945, the US Army recorded that mines were
responsible for 2.5% of troop casualties and 20.7% of tank losses.ii
At this stage, mines impacted primarily upon military operations. In the 1960’s
however, the problem took a huge leap forward with United States operations
against the Pathet Lao and in attempts to close the Ho Chi Minh trail in South
East Asia. From 1965 to 1970, the US military dropped over 2.5 million tonnes
of Ordnance over Indochinaiii much of which failed to explode. A generally
accepted principle is a 10% dud rate, suggesting that over this period, 250,000
tonnes of UXO remains over SE Asia.iv At the same time, forces of both sides
were laying huge amounts of mines, particularly in Vietnam and the east of
Cambodia.
The Americans found that the mines and UXO used in South East Asia were a
double-edged sword. A recently declassified US intelligence document stated
that mines and booby traps accounted for 65-70% of US Marine Corps
casualties in Vietnam during 1965 – and a good proportion of these from their
own weapons.v
It was during this period of indiscriminate bombing and mining that the
humanitarian tragedy began to unfold. Although the explosives dropped along
the Ho Chi Minh trail may have had some effectiveness against the Viet Cong
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and the Pathet Lao, increasingly victims were civilians, and certainly once
hostilities ceased, the increasing pattern of civilian casualties continued.
From those beginnings, came the makings of the global humanitarian crisis that
is extant today. There are currently 90 countries affected by Landmines or
UXO.vi

However, classification of the severity of the problem is not

straightforward. For example, the United Kingdom is on the list because of the
mines laid during the Falklands conflict in 1982. Although these have caused
no civilian casualties since the conflict, the classification remains. In an attempt
to better understand the scale of the problem, a number of initiatives are
currently under way.
The ongoing Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) initiative, aims to provide a method
for assessing the scale of the problem within a country. In addition, the United
Nations carries out a number of rapid assessment missions to evaluate the
impact and scope of mines in a country and to recommend a suitable response.
Thus far, some 30 countries have undergone assessments or surveys since
1997. Of the 90 affected countries, it would not be unreasonable to suggest
that in the region of 30 of these countries should be classified as “highly
impacted”. Similarly, there are some 13 affected countries that have recorded
no casualties since 1999, including Costa Rica, Guatemala and the United
Kingdom.vii
The next question to address is how the global community has dealt with this
crisis. The first serious international intervention to deal with the problems of a
country occurred in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal in 1988. In the
early days following the withdrawal, casualties were estimated to be around 2025 per day in the countryviii and this equated to a clear humanitarian crisis. This
triggered a number of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), both Afghan
and international, to begin setting up programmes to clear mines, using local
and expatriate staff to do so.
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The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) set forth
upon a plan to train 15,000 Afghans in manual mine clearance. The plan, with
hindsight, was crudely thought out due to the lack of knowledge of how deal
with such an issue, but it remains the first serious attempt to carry out and run a
humanitarian mine clearance programme.
Today, some 37 affected countries3 have some form of body responsible for the
coordination of mine action activities.ix These bodies range from a two man
government sponsored unit such as has been established in Guinea-Bissau,
through to the full scale programme currently operating in Afghanistan with a
headquarters coordinating 12 NGOs fielding over 6,500 deminers. Annex A
shows the state of UN supported programmes and the extant state of
development of those programmes.
The role of the UN in mine action
The UN states that the purpose of mine action is to recreate a safe environment
conducive to normal life and developmentx. Mine Action encompasses five
complementary core components (the “five pillars”):
•

Mine awareness and risk reduction education;

•

Mine clearance, including survey, mapping, and marking;

•

Victim assistance;

•

Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines;

•

Advocacy to stigmatise the use of landmines and support a total ban on antipersonnel landmines.xi

The UN is probably the only viable organisation that can take on the role of
coordination of the global landmine effort. From the early days of 1988, when
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
3

Abkhasia, Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Jordan, Kosovo, Laos, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique,
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(UNOCHA) initiated the Afghan programme, the structure and direction of the
UN mine action community has changed significantly.

Initially, there was

minimal knowledge and little idea of how to develop a viable programme. Since
then, many lessons have been learned and the structures of the UN mine action
services have altered to form the basis of the system in place today.
It is important to understand that the United Nations will generally only operate
within a country if the host Government has invited them to do so. A recent
notable exception to this is of course Kosovo, where the UN mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) operated under a General Assembly Resolutionxii allowing them to
operate as the de facto Government. UNMIK was able therefore to focus on
specific operational goals with minimal diversion. Unsurprisingly, the Mine
Action Coordination centre (MACC) in Kosovo has been recognised as one of
the most successful, operating, in effect, in a political void. In addition, the
MACC had the benefit of being very well resourced relative to the scope of the
problem.
In other countries, programmes are subject to the guidance of national
governments and generally aim to build the capacity of the local staff to a level
at which the (relatively expensive) expatriate staff can withdraw and leave the
national programme to operate by itself. Indeed one of the specific objectives of
the United Nations is to have, by 2005, ‘National and local capacities {are} in
place to plan, coordinate and implement mine-action programmes’.xiii Whilst
this is in itself a commendable ideal, the realities of the situation often result in
programmes that are stifled by the national government that they were set up to
support.
Outside the specific mine action sector, the UN has come under some criticism
over recent years with regards to the competency of their Peace Keeping
Operations (PKO). Most recently, the “Brahimi report”, commissioned directly
by the Secretary-General of the UN, stated that: “Over the last decade, the
Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Rwanda, Somaliland, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen and
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United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge; and it can do no
better today.”xiv The time period mentioned in the report corresponds directly
with the period of time that mine action programmes have been initiated, often
as part of these very PKO.
In addition to the complications of host government interventions, the potential
for difficulties is compounded by the structure of the UN organisations tasked to
work in the mine action environment.

There are no less than 11 UN

departments or agencies operating in the sector. The roles and responsibilities
of the three main agencies are outlined below and are expanded upon in Annex
B:xv

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
UNMAS is the focal point for all mine-related activities. It is responsible for
ensuring a coordinated response to landmine contamination, establishing
priorities for assessment missions and coordinating the mobilisation of
resources.

It is also responsible for the preparation and maintenance of

technical standards, the collection and maintenance of mine related data,
advocacy in support of a global ban on mines and for the management of the
Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) which is the central fund to which donors channel
their funds through the UN system for mine action. The UNMAS is part of the
Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO).
The UN Development Programme (UNDP)
UNDP is the focus for the establishment of national and local capacity and
addressing the socio-economic consequences of mine contamination. UNDP
will normally have the prime responsibility for the development of integrated,
sustainable mine action programmes where programmes have passed the
“emergency” stage.

Zambia.

2-6

The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
UNOPS is a service provider for integrated mine action and capacity building
programmes. It implements programmes as appropriate in conjunction with the
concerned partners (such as UNMAS, UNDP etc,).

UNOPS is the Agency

responsible for recruitment of international staff of programmes. In addition,
UNOPS coordinate and manage a programme in Northern Iraq funded by the
“Oil for Food” agreement between the UN and the Iraqi Government with a
budget of £45 million between 1997 and 2000.

Notwithstanding the complications inherent within the structures outlined above,
there is a general intention that the agencies will work together to form, at the
request of the host government, an organisation to coordinate mine action
activities within a particular country.
The first step to be considered is the specific need of a nation, and UNMAS will
normally plan and implement a multi-discipline assessment mission to analyse
the problem and to recommend a solution. The team will be formed from a
number of different agencies and will look at the situation from all angles. Once
again, the UN emphasise that normally they must be requested to assist by the
host nation, and often, this process can take a long time to come about.
The multi-agency team will make recommendations based upon their combined
approach and expertise and if it is appropriate, a programme of some form will
be initiated to overcome extant problems. All development will generally be
done in close coordination with the host government. The exceptions would be
if there were no host government to work with. An example of this situation
would be the deployment of the Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) in
Kosovo – often referred to as “the most successful mine action programme”xvi.
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i

Flemming, cited in Croll M, History of Landmines. (Pen and Sword Books), November 1998.
Croll M, op cit.
iii
Prokosh E, The Technology of Killing, (Zed books, 1995), p105
iv
Mines Advisory Group, quoted at http://www.calweb.com/~gaia/secretwar/
v
US Defence Intelligence Agency, Landmine Warfare – Trends and Projections, cited in McGrath R,
Landmines and UXO – A Resource Book, Pluto Press 2000, p 8
vi
Landmine Monitor Report 2001 – towards a Mine-Free World, Human Rights Watch, August 2001.
vii
Interview with Anne Capelle of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Geneva, May
2002.
viii
Roberts S & Williams J, After the guns fall silent – The enduring legacy of Landmines. (Vietnam
Veterans of America Foundation, 1995), p14.
ix
Landmine Monitor, ibid, p43. Plus interview with Martin Donoghue, UN Mine Action Service, Geneva,
May 2002, noting additions of Sri Lanka and DR Congo in 2002.
x
United Nations mine action: a strategy for 2001-2005, United Nations General Assembly Fifty-sixth
session, Agenda item 38, Assistance in mine action. (A/56/448)
xi
op cit.
ii

xii

United Nations Resolution 1244 (1999), Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on
10th June 1999
xiii
op cit, Strategic goal Three.
xiv
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, United Nations General Assembly Security
Council, A/55/305-S/2000/809, (The Brahimi Report), 21st August 2000
xv
Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Policy. UN policy document A/53/496 of
1998.
xvi
Scott JJ, “The Kosovo MACC: The most successful Mine Action Programme ever”, Journal of Mine
Action, Issue 6.1, Winter 2002.

2-8

Chapter 3
Literature review
Introduction
Much has been written about development in the humanitarian aid sector over
recent years and there is a wide range of material to draw upon. The Mine
Action sector has also been well documented, although because of the relative
youth of the industry, much of the documentation is not as well developed as it
might be.
The problems encountered by the United Nations and a number of governments
in the setting up and development of a number of mine action programmes in
numerous countries45 are manifold. In some cases, the development of these
coordination efforts have been meticulously recorded, in some cases, efforts
have been ad hoc and there is little solid data to be drawn from the situation.
Aim
The aim of this chapter is to draw on relevant texts, both primary and
secondary, as well as interview-based data, in order to focus more clearly on
the development of national mine action capacities so that a detailed analysis of
the situation can be undertaken.

The chapter will also consider texts from

outside the mine action sector that prove to be of benefit to the study.
Methodology and Scope
The literature review will assess the available publications in the areas of
general mine action, as well as the strategic planning and organisational areas.
Mine action literature is not, in general terms, well stocked with quality literature
although there are a number of noteworthy exceptions

4

It is assessed by the UN that as of June 2002, there are 37 countries with coordinated mine action (either
UN or other agencies) clearance efforts underway.
5
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With such a short timescale for the development of theory of organisation
structure in humanitarian mine action (i.e., the 13 years of operations since the
first humanitarian mine clearance in Afghanistan), and with such a diverse
catalogue of countries in which programmes are operating, the studies
undertaken to analyse the structures are limited.

The influences on the

development of individual countries actions are as varied as the different
cultural, political and environmental issues might cause them to be.
General background.
The humanitarian impact of landmines on populations has had such an
invidious effect on populations that much has been written on the effect of
landmines from the humanitarian perspective. Much of the early writing was
emotionally based and stirred huge political support but ultimately did little to
develop any clear perspective on the problem. In 1994, the United States’
Department of State issued a reporti that described an extremely gloomy and
apparently insurmountable problem estimating that there were between 80-110
million landmines planted around the world. It estimated that the previous year,
only 80,000 had been lifted, whilst 2.5 million had been laid. Although the
background research was generally valid, in the follow on publicationii, some 4
years later the numbers were estimated downwards to 60-70 million and the
report suggested that more mines were coming out of the ground than were
going in. The reality is that numbers of mines actually mean very little, and are
seldom quoted these days – the humanitarian impact is by far the most valuable
judgmental factor (although of course is far more subjective and therefore more
open to interpretation).
In terms of this type of background, the researcher’s library has been
significantly bolstered by the publication of the Landmine Monitoriii.

This

publication was first produced in 1999 by a group of organisations under the
umbrella of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) – the
organisation that acted as the driver for the eventual implementation of the AP
Mine Ban Treaty in 1997. The report has been published and updated annually
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since then and is now recognised to be the key source of data for any research
in the mine action arena. It is meticulously researched and provides a solid
reference base for any researcher in the mine action arena and as well as
charting the progress of signatory and non-signatory countries towards the ideal
of the AP Mine Ban Treaty, provides an excellent snapshot of how each mine
affected country is progressing in its mine clearance activities. It charts this
under a number of sub headings such as: ‘Mine Ban Policy, Use, Landmine
Problem, Mine Action Activities, Mine Awareness, Casualties and Victim
Assistance’iv
Rae McGrath’s Resource Bookv gives an excellent insight for the uninitiated to
the mine action world in defining the terms and general background. Whilst it
defines the environment in simplistic terms, it was the first book that clearly
explained to the layman the complications of the industry.
Finally, there is a tri-annual journal that has become accepted globally as the
central forum for publication of issues from all angles, in the mine action world.
James Madison University in Virginia, USA, became involved some six years
ago in the mine action arena, sponsored by the United States Department of
State (DoS) to promote coordination between operators and programmes.
James Madison University produce the “Journal of Mine Action”, published
since the summer of 1997. The journal regularly turns out thought provoking
articles, but the journal is not refereed, partly due to the cultural environment of
the industry – it seems that, at the moment, it is probably too young to feel
comfortable within such tight constraints.
Specific programme publications
Once the general mine action theatre has been outlined and understood, a
more detailed analysis of the structure of how countries and the UN attend to
the problem needs to be considered. There are again here a number of papers
ranging from the National Programmes unpublished and published reports,
through to wide ranging studies on organisational structures.
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A seminal piece of work was developed in 1997 by a 3-person team, Bob
Eaton, Chris Horwood and Norah Niland. The UN Department of Humanitarian
Affairs (DHA) commissioned a ‘lessons learned’ study titled “Development of
Indigenous Mine Action Capacities”vi looking at UN established programmes in
four of the most severely affected countries in the world – Afghanistan, Angola,
Cambodia and Mozambique. The Terms of Reference (TOR) define the overall
objective of the study to: “…enhance the capacity of all actors involved in the
planning, development and implementation of mine-action programmes to
determine the most appropriate and cost-effective means for the initiation and
development of indigenous capabilities essential for the management and
sustainability of mine-action programmes.”vii The study produced a number of
findings and made recommendations, many of which have shaped the structure
of mine action today. In particular, the two case studies on Cambodia and
Mozambique are of great significance in charting the development of mine
action in those two countries.viii/ix These reports are still regularly referred to as
extremely valuable pieces of work, even though the environment has
significantly changed. As an example, the TOR for the study required the team
to: ‘examine the role of DHA {…} in assisting local authorities to define
programme goals and philosophy’x. It was perhaps unfortunate that, whilst the
study was being prepared, the focal point responsibility for landmines was
transferred from DHA to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO).
Whilst these obstacles did cause some problems in the drafting, the core of the
report and its findings remained valid.
Finally, a paper published by the Swedish Government as an analysis of the
impact of their contributions to HMAxi is an excellent, up to date report
considering a number of structural and organisational issues with the specific
Swedish interventions. This particular report recognises that considerable
improvements have been made over the last few years, yet also recognises that
programme development is still in its infancy.
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The role of the military
Military forces have traditionally been responsible for the planning and
deployment of minefields as well as combat breaching operations (in which it is
commonly accepted that a certain number of casualties is acceptable). More
recently, as a more general position, the military have begun working in PeaceKeeping Operations (PKO), a part of which may include responsibilities within
HMA. Whilst the juxtaposition of the role of the military does not always sit
comfortably within PKO, the recognition that the military play a strong role in
supporting PKO is noted. In a recent report commissioned by the Secretary –
General of the UN, the team suggested that there is a significant shortfall in
quality troops and expresses a great deal of concern that nations who are on
the UNs database for military assets available to the UN for support to PKO.
The report says that: “…many Member States are saying ‘no’ to deploying
formed military units to United Nations-led peacekeeping operations, far more
often than they are saying ‘yes’.”xii
In the field of HMA, few nations are prepared to commit their forces to
operational demining, preferring instead to fill specialist training and
coordination roles.

For example, the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) have

conducted a number of courses for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
technicians from a number of countries – indeed in one recent course,
technicians from all three entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) were trained
together.xiii

In terms of coordination, SFOR pride themselves in their

coordination efforts in the field of demining. “There are few areas where SFOR,
along with the Entity Armed Forces (EAF), stand as united as in the field of
engineering. They are particularly united in the clearance of mines, utilising
their combined strength to do so.”xiv
National armed forces also have a significant role to play in the clearance of
their own territory. As noted, the EAF in BiH take the lead in clearance under
the coordination of SFOR & the BiH MAC. In the United Kingdom, the MOD are
showing increasing interest in the clearance of mined areas in the Falkland
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Islands and on the 17th July 2001, the UK and Argentine Foreign Ministers
agreed that an Exchange of Notes on a demining feasibility study should take
place. The study and the subsequent clearance will be funded by the Argentine
Government.xv The feasibility study is underway and a contractor has been
identified but not, as yet, accredited as required by IMAS. Costs are difficult to
assess but an Argentinean estimate suggested that around $253 million would
be required to clear all minefields on the islands.xvi

It is worth noting that

although the Falklands has many thousands of mines laid throughout the
islands, there had not been a human casualty since September 1983.
However, the government of the United Kingdom is a States Party to the AP
Mine Ban Treaty, which commits them to clearing all AP mines from the
Falklands by 1 March 2009.
Mine issues
There are a number of studies and reports to study the structures of mine action
and the development of mine action in these two countries. By far the most
significant is the Development of Indigenous Capacity Study as mentioned
previously.
Mines”

xvii

In Cambodia, the most significant publication is “War of the

which outlines the scope of the mines problem in Cambodia, followed

by a number of specific programme reports. In particular, the Cambodian Mine
Action Centre’s (CMAC) own publication, “From Emergency to Developmentxviii”
provides logic for many of the decisions taken during the development of
CMAC. Many of these publications recognise that the industry has come a long
way in a short time and that whilst much has improved, there is still great scope
for continued improvement.

Another key factor identified by the majority of

authors on the subject area is the difficulties in making the transition from
emergency into development.
The development of literature over the last five years (prior to this point, there
was very little indeed to use in any substantive way, primarily because the
industry was so young and undeveloped) has been rapid and the amount of
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quality research increased from virtually nil, to a state where there is quality
literature, if the researcher looks hard enough.
Finally, for Mozambique, there is one key publication. Laurie Boulden was a
researcher with the South African Institute of International Affairs in the late
1990’s and produced a bookxix in which she outlines the political intricacies and
bureaucratic tangles that hindered clearance efforts in Mozambique in the post
ONUMOZ years. The problem in Mozambique, she says, is that “poor national
coordination, rivalries amongst the various actors and bureaucratic minutiae
have each hindered efforts…{but that}… However, that projects are under way
is the most important fact”. Boulden summarises by stating that “no matter how
crooked or long the path might be, de-mining in Mozambique has clearly been
making an impact where it is needed, not in the boardrooms of Maputo or the
capitals of Europe, but in the fields and villages of the country.” xx
Summary
Much of the writing has focussed on the analysis of detailed elements of the
mine action industry since 1990 and recognises that, although there are still
huge problems in the industry, some mitigation may be allowed for because of
the development span of the industry.

Many recommendations have been

made, some of which have been acted on, to the benefit of the community, and
other recommendations, which may be less acceptable for political or financial
reasons.
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Chapter 4
Analyses of mine action programmes
Structure
The development of the two country studies uses a general framework to give
structure to the analysis. A background section gives the historical and political
reasons for the environment in which countries find themselves. Following this,
a contemporary analysis assesses the development of the current state of
affairs and identifies a number of critical variables and key issues arising.
In addition to the detailed analysis of Cambodia and Mozambique, this chapter
will also provide a more general introduction to a more recent programme in
Lebanon, which will be analysed in more detail for lessons learned, in chapter 7.
Mozambique
On the 4th October 1992, 30 years of fighting in Mozambique drew to a close as
the leader of the rebel forces (RENAMO), Afonso Dhlakama signed the General
Peace Accord, together with President Joaquim Chissano, of the Republic of
Mozambique.
Protocol VI of the Accord provided for the Mozambican government and the
former rebels, RENAMO, to take responsibility for the implementation of the
cease fire process and to “…organise and implement mine-clearing operations”
and assured that they would not “prevent {any} mine-clearing operations”.i The
same accord also allowed the UN to verify compliance with the accord.
The subsequent UN deployment, ONUMOZ (Organização Naçional Unido de
Moçambique) of 6,400 soldiers and UN workers had a mandate that spanned
from the accord, which provided for them to work with the national authorities to
coordinate mine clearance activities within the country. The ONUMOZ mine
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clearance plan (based upon an essentially military organisation) was in three
phases:
1. Clearance of 2,000 km of priority roads to allow access of food supplies to
refugee camps.
2. Clearance of further roads to allow refugees to return home.
3. Setting up training school to train Mozambican deminers to complete the
remainder of work required.ii
Unfortunately, even though the peace accord had been signed, any effort to
coordinate demining was delayed until November 1993 and in reality, it was not
until mid 1994 that efforts began in earnest. The first two objectives of road
clearance and opening the way for refugee return were achieved by contracting
out to commercial organisations to open the roads and the opening of a training
school in Moamba, Southern Mozambique, began to achieve the third phase.
All these arrangements were carried out under the auspices of ONUMOZ and
with the oversight of UNOHAC (the predecessor of UNOCHA and working
within DHA). It soon however became clear that the concept of training 500
deminers was not viable unless some organisations were formed which were
capable of managing their deployment. With this in mind, ONUMOZ set up the
Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) in August 1994. The programme was
organised along classic military lines, with Headquarters and ten “platoons” of
40 deminers each. At the beginning, the ADP was heavily reliant upon the 40
plus expatriates working within the programme – a roughly equal split between
military staff working within ONUMOZ (mainly New Zealand and Australian
military, with little or no experience of demining) and civilians (a good proportion
of whom are former military) who were hired for their previous experience within
mine action programmes or within specific functional areas such as
administration, finance and logistics as well as operational elements.
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It is worth noting that ONUMOZs original intention was to develop ADP into a
viable national entity, and they hired and trained (on the job) quality national
staff. It is also interesting to note the US Ambassador to Mozambique during
the ONUMOZ period wrote a damning report detailing the failures of the
mission, in which he states: “ONUMOZ was the first UN PKO {Peace-Keeping
Operation} to incorporate a large humanitarian component. Perhaps it should be
the last (…) In the case of both mine clearance and demobilization, UNOHAC
insisted on pushing a long-term developmental approach designed to empower
the local government. Such an approach could never be completed successfully
and would have jeopardized key parts of the process”.iii Perhaps he would have
been less critical with the hindsight of analysing the demining capacities in
Mozambique today, although it was recognised that the US were particularly
critical of the UN’s efforts in Mozambique.iv
Blaikie et alv lay down a number of principles for managing disaster recovery.
Whilst a UN mission post conflict does not fit directly into the category of
disaster recovery, there are interesting parallels. Principle 12 proposes that
efforts should: “Maximise the transition from relief to development”.vi Blaikie et
al suggest that “relief creates dependency, so it is vital that as soon as the
emergency needs are satisfied there is a return to a development approach”.vii
In Bangladesh following the 1991 cyclone, a refugee was reported as saying
“we want work, not relief”.

viii

The comment would be as appropriate for the

Mozambican as for the Bangladeshi.
Whilst the UN was clearly attempting to drive the process of clearance forward,
there was an enormous lack of coordination. A number of survey and clearance
projects had been under way since as early as 1991. Indeed critics asserted
that demining occurred “despite, not because of the UN”.ix Unfortunately, these
efforts were not coordinated and even with the arrival of ONUMOZ, there
seemed to be little hope of this.
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As noted previously, the original intention was always to develop the ADP into a
fully independent, sustainable Mozambican demining organisation that would be
passed over to the Mozambican government in 1996. Training of deminers was
carried out at the school and in the headquarters and two contractors provided
‘on the job’ training for the management staff. After ONUMOZ withdrew in early
1995, ADP came under the auspices of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs
(DHA) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). All parties concerned felt
that ADP would not be ready to become fully independent of international
assistance, and ADP became a ‘Nationally Executed Project (NEX)”6 of the
UNDP in early 1996.
Although a number of key stakeholders did not believe that the Mozambican
government was ready to take on the ADP, they did accept the government’s
responsibility to exercise sovereignty over mine action activities by the creation
in May 1995 of the Comissão Nacional de Desminagem (CND) – the intention
being to provide a national coordinating body. CND was an executive branch of
the National Mine Clearance Commission (NMCC), which comprised the
Ministers of foreign affairs (as chair), finance, agriculture, public buildings,
national defence and industry.x

CND was charged at this time with

coordinating, assisting, proposing, licensing and regulating all mine action
activities in Mozambique.
Unfortunately however, a number of objectives were not met by NMCC/CND
and the donors, UN and other actors were beginning to doubt the viability of a
Mozambican authority with little support from the Governmentxi. During this
phase, UNDP became the prime UN point of contact as DHA stepped back and
focussed on ADP.
At the same time as the formation of the NMCC/CND, both UNDP & DHA were
tabling a proposal for a Mozambican Mine Action Centre (MOZMAC).
6

The

The term nationally executed programme essentially describes a project run by a governmental agency
although under UNDP auspices and is described in more detail in the UNDP programme manual
published December 2000. See the UNDP programme manual at http://www.undp.org/osg/pm/
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intention was that MOZMAC would be responsible for all aspects of demining
(including coordination and execution)xii.

This was the first suggestion in

Mozambique that a Mine Action Centre be formed. There was limited support
but many donors felt this proposal was too top heavy and required too many
resources. They may also have felt that the task was beyond the capability of
the Mozambican government. With hindsight, that failure to develop MOZMAC
may well have been a blessing in disguise.
The NMCC failed to collect any form of momentum, and although it was formed
in May 1995, it did not formally meet until over a year laterxiii. Its mandate was
clear:
“{to} collect, process and analyse information and data relevant to demining, elaborate a
strategy and action plan for mine clearance, and establish procedures for
setting priorities at the local and national level; monitor and coordinate all
ongoing demining activities; act as the approval and licensing authority in
respect of new operators..; adjudicate public tenders for service contracts…;
and promote and oversee the implementation of a national programme to
improve public mine awareness.xiv”

In reality, CND failed to achieve any of these objectives and, as a result, many
of the mine action operators in the country were operating to their own direction,
with no coordination.

The drive, primarily from the donors but also from

operators, for improvement eventually led to the restructuring of CND in June
1999 after more than $10 million had been given by donors in support of
NMCC/CNDxv.
The restructured organisation, Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (IND) was left
with a similar mandate to “successfully establish and develop a coordination,
supervision and management mechanism, in close cooperation with all other
relevant organisations and agencies, to ensure the cost-effective execution of a
national mine action plan”xvi, but with much greater autonomy and reporting
direct to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and outside the cumbersome
governmental bureaucracy to carry out its functions. Indeed, the IND has had
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greater success than its predecessor organisation.

The donors have been

more positive about supporting IND and the future for IND looks to be much
more secure. Even though there was some initial scepticism over IND’s ability
to establish authority over mine action operators who had been working
effectively independently for the previous eight years, a productive relationship
has now been established between all the stakeholders in Mozambique.
The ADP has however had different types of difficulties. Following its early
success, ADP has continued to move forward and has seldom had a problem
with funding – something rare in the mine action industry.7 There are a number
of reasons for this – the organisation is recognised as one of the more effective
in mine action throughout the world and the donors also trust the organisation to
a greater extent than many other organisations. In addition, the ADP has an
extremely charismatic Director who has been with the programme since 1995
and has a flair for raising funds from donors. Unfortunately, there is currently a
large question mark over the ADP and its status. Since the formative ONUMOZ
days, the ADP has evolved from a UN operated and managed programme to
being an independent NEX project with minimal UNDP involvement. In 1999,
ADP began the planning for the process of transformation into a national nongovernmental organisation (NGO), which follows completely the rationale of a
nationally executed project.

Unfortunately, this is now unlikely to come to

fruition as a recent consultants’ reportxvii recommended that this transition is not
a viable option and recommended that ADP should become part of IND,
although with some autonomy. The principle reason for this problem is the lack
of legislation within Mozambique for the support and structuring of NGOs. It
appears that there are significant organisational and structural problems
inherent within this particular recommendation, but it remains to be seen if these
recommendations are implemented.

7

Based on the author’s experiences since 1994, funding is a perennial problem.
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Cambodia
Cambodian history is a tragedy in itself. Since the intervention of the US, the
Khmer Rouge and the subsequent genocide, huge problems have beset the
country.

The first landmines were laid in the country by North Vietnamese

troops in 1967 and throughout the Vietnam War period to protect Vietnamese
bases and the Ho Chi Minh trail which ran through Eastern Cambodia.
Between 1969 and 1973, the United States responded in the form of covert
operations on the ground (including extensive mine laying) and by dropping
539,129 tonnes of ordnance in and on neutral Cambodia.xviii In 1970, following
the overthrow of the Royal government, civil war broke out and mines continued
to be laid by the succeeding Government and subsequently between 1975 and
1979, by the ruling Khmer Rouge regime. Even following the overthrow of the
Khmer Rouge in 1979, mines continued to be laid by the government as a
protective act, even as late as 1993, after the deployment of the UN mission to
Cambodia.
In 1991, with the signing of the Paris Peace Accord, the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was mandated to oversee the
implementation of the accords and oversee the forthcoming elections.

In

addition, it was given a mandate of “… assisting with clearing mines and
undertaking training programmes in mine clearance and a mines awareness
programme among the Cambodian people.”xix In December 1991, the advance
mission of UNTAC set up the Mine Clearance and Training Unit (MCTU) to
achieve the training element of this mandate. The TOR of MCTU were very
clear with an aim of the unit to recruit and train deminers and supervisors and
also set up the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC). The plan was to train
over 5,000 deminersxx. There was one unfortunate and major glitch with the
mandate – there were no funds available for the implementation of this plan.
UNTAC had no specific budget for mine clearance and as such, much of the
earlier funds were acquired directly from donor countries, outside the standard
UN system.

This situation remained extant until the end of the UNTAC
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deployment in 1993. In February 1993, MCTU had trained 1,960 deminers, yet
1,354 were not employed as deminers.xxi A second point to note in respect to
the mandate is that in the early discussion phases, there were no
considerations made with regards the need to plan and coordinate mine
clearance activities in the country – including the coordination of NGOs. With
hindsight this would prove to be somewhat naïve.
CMAC was formed on 10th June 1992 and was envisaged to oversee mine
action activities in Cambodia throughout the period and in theory, MCTU was
subordinate to CMAC. In reality however, this relationship was virtually nonexistent and there was little interaction between the two.

In fact the

coordination role envisaged for CMAC was not undertaken at all. Expatriate
advisors carried out virtually all management functions and: “were effectively
operating as Executive Directors of all activities undertaken {by a Cambodian
agency}…and were not usually familiar with Cambodia culture and tended to
lack pedagogical skills”xxii.
In 1994, MCTU and CMAC combined under the CMAC umbrella and effectively
gave the organisation a combined policy setting, management, coordination and
implementation capacity. Again, as in Mozambique, in theory this organisation
had an executive inter ministerial body with representatives from a number of
government ministries. CMAC was, in theory, responsible for the coordination
of all mine action activities in the country, but although some NGOs operating
were keen to establish links with CMAC, many found themselves unwilling to be
coordinated by an organisation that had proved itself to be painfully slow and
inefficient.
CMAC lurched from crisis to crisis without effective resolve and without an
effective executive body.

A December 1995 UNDP evaluation found that

CMAC was deficient in terms of: “short and long term planning, monthly cash
flow crises, and poorly trained mid level management.”xxiii All this was difficult to
comprehend as the 3,000+ strong organisation had 36 highly qualified
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expatriate technical advisors overseeing the activities.xxiv This figure actually
increased to over 60 following this assessment mission.xxv
In 1995, a Royal decree (effectively a statute), changed CMAC’s terms of
reference and gave CMAC full authority to coordinate all demining activities in
Cambodia,xxvi as well as to carry out demining activities, and CMAC became an
autonomous Cambodian institution with an overseeing Governing Council to
direct the overall policy and direction of the organisation. The governing council
never really seemed to have an impact even though the European Commission
supported it during the years 1997-8. As in Mozambique, it appears that the
council was too moribund and bureaucratic to have any real impact.
A further crisis occurred in 1999, which culminated in the removal of the
Cambodian director of CMAC as well as the resignation of the UNDP Project
Manager. It also led to CMAC shedding 90% of its staff of 3,000. This time the
catalyst was an allegation of financial impropriety on the part of senior
management, leading to an audit that confirmed some of the charges on the
Cambodian side and which was leaked in large part to local news organisations.
No financial mismanagement was revealed in the UNDP administered Trust
Fund, but the KPMG audit did describe serious managerial deficiencies.
Predictably this led to a breakdown of donor confidence in the organisation.xxvii
Three years on, CMAC now appears to have regained some confidence of the
donors and had an annual budget in 2001 of $7.5 million as opposed to the $13
million budget before the scandal. The organisation now employs 2,264 people.
The subsequent donor initiated financial and management audit classified
CMAC as: “seriously deficient” as opposed to the most recent audit results in
2001 showing the organisation to be “marginally deficient”.xxviii
The need for high-level coordination in Cambodia may be questioned. In early
2002, there are only two operators (HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group)
operationally involved in mine action in Cambodia outside of CMAC.
Nonetheless, these two organisations, as well as a number of others involved
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on the periphery, have all indicated their intention to work to a central
coordinating agency and in earlier days did so to some degree to the then
coordinating agency, CMAC.
The most recent change in the structure of demining in Cambodia has been the
introduction of a new organisation, the Cambodian (National) Mine Action
Authority (CMAA), an organisation set up with the intention of coordinating all
demining activities in Cambodia – again, with parallels to the setting up of the
IND in Mozambique.

This agency is a government body with a significant

amount of autonomy. The organisation is somewhat behind the development
timeline originally planned – having been set up for over one year (as of June
2002), it has only two members of staff and one expatriate advisor attached to
the CMAAxxix. Nonetheless, it appears to be an appropriate development that
may lead to the improvement of more focussed coordination activities in
Cambodia, as well as allowing CMAC to deliver their core business – that of the
operational delivery of mine action.
Comparison and summary
Whilst it is clear that the two countries considered are very different in many
ways, there are undoubtedly parallels and the influences that have affected the
development will undoubtedly affect the advancement of other future
programmes around the world. Both were developed under UN PKO, one of
which (Cambodia) was under severe strain at the time. Both went through very
difficult times and structural difficulties but emerged a decade on into what are
now beginning to be recognised as structurally sound establishments.
The two countries whose developmental processes have been briefly outlined in
this chapter are not unique. They represent two typical situations but are unique
amongst themselves.

Perhaps if a short cut could be found around this

process, much suffering, both humanitarian and institutional, could be
eliminated.
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Lebanon
The aim of this section is to outline the background to the mine action
environment in Lebanon.

This brief background will be expanded upon in

chapter 7 where the study will analyse lessons learned against the development
of the programme
The main landmine problem in Lebanon began during the civil war between
1975 and 1990. At the same time, The Israeli Armed Forces (IF) occupied a
zone in the South of the country to provide a security buffer zone. Israel and
their South Lebanon Army (SLA) allies used mines to protect and consolidate
their positions in the zone of occupation as well as mining the border between
Israel and Lebanon. In addition to the civil war, some mines and UXO had been
left behind from the French Mandate in Lebanon between 1920 and 1943.
Following the period between 1975 and 1990, the Lebanese military began an
assessment of the country using maps, military records and general
intelligence. Their conclusion was that there were in the region of 150,000
mines, excluding the previously occupied zone in the South.xxx
The IF also handed over a number of records of minefields to the United
Nations peacekeeping operation in place at the time, United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which indicated that there were approximately
130,000 mines and some 288 booby traps in the former occupied zone.xxxi
In February and June 1999, UNMAS led two inter-agency assessment
missions, at the request of the Government of Lebanon (GOL), to determine the
requirement for UN assistance.

The result of the two missions was the

establishment in July 2000 of a regional (i.e. in the Southern former occupied
zone) Mine Action Coordination Cell (MACC)8 under the mandate of the UN
PKO in place then (and still in place), UNIFIL.

The organisation was

established within the compound of the UNIFIL in Naqoura, Southern Lebanon.
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The UN MACC is donor funded through the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), which
is coordinated by the UNMAS and through assessed contributions from the
regular UN budget because of the UNIFIL mandate.
The Lebanese military had also been carrying out mine clearance operations
since the cessation of hostilities in 1990 and in September 1999 a structured
national body, the National Demining Office (NDO) was established in Beirut.
The NDO is effectively the de juro national mine action authority and reports to
the government through the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) had been carrying out clearance operations under the authority of
the national government. The NDO was set up with limited financial support
from the US Government.
Another element added to the complexity of the management of the situation
when in 2001 the Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) expressed its
desire to assist the GOL in their efforts to clear landmines. This effort was in
the form of a programme called Operation Emirates Solidarity (OES), which
pledged funding for up to $50 million to fund operational demining support in
Lebanon.

Unlike the majority of donors, the UAE wished to have direct

management control of the money they were contributing and as such,
established a cell, which became attached to the UN MACC as well as the
NDO.
The coordination of the three extant agencies; the NDO, the UNIFIL MACC and
the UAE cell presented a problem thus far not encountered anywhere in the
mine action industry. Within the realms of the UNIFIL MACC, the integration
proved to be less difficult that had been first envisaged. Figure 4-1 shows the
organisational structure of the UNIFIL MACC in terms of the specific roles
funded and filled by the UN and the UAE. It is interesting to note the balance
between the positions. The reality of this implementation was that the balance

8

The UN MACC has changed names a number of times during its existence. Initially it was the UNIFIL
MACC (cell), then the UN MACC (cell) and in 2001, it became the UN MACC (centre).
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was achieved without too many difficulties due to the broad perspective of the
advisors within the organisation at that time.

UAE Funded Posts
UN Funded Posts
UAE Funded International and National

UN Component

Staff Posts

International and National Staff Posts

Admin/Fin

Operations Officer

Chief Mines Info Officer

Officer

QA Officer

QA Officer

Archive Data clerk

Plans Officer

IMSMA Assistant
GIS

QA Assistant

QA Assistant

Mine Awareness
Asst.

Plans Assistant

Assit/Clerk
GIS

Driver

Assit/Clerk

Driver
Ops Assistant
HR Fin

Reg/Com

Accountant

Clerk

Data Entry Clerk
Logistics Assistant

Ops Clerk

Driver

Data Entry Clerk

Senior Driver

Cleaner

Driver
Communicator

UN:

5 x International

UAE:

2 x International

13 x National

Driver
Communicator

Figure 4-1 – UN MACC South Lebanon establishment as of September 2001.
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Chapter 5
Organisational Structures and roles and a global model?
Introduction
The previous chapters have outlined the current state of the industry in terms of
the history, development and current state of global mine action. The two case
studies of Cambodia and Mozambique have given the reader an idea of the
typical development processes and problems encountered throughout the
development. The environment in which the mine action community exists is
not a vacuum and it is important to realise that there are a large number of
external influences impacting on the development of strategy and concepts.
Perhaps one of the best examples of this is the development of the Mine Action
Coordination Centre (MACC) in Kosovo. As already mentioned, the Kosovo
MACC has been called the “most successful mine action centre ever”i. It is not
the intention of this study to agree or disagree with that assessment, but it
isworth noting that the Kosovo environment was unique, with no national
government in place, and the MACC programme manager acting as the de
facto Minister of Landmines within a homogeneous and receptive population
and with an enviable level of resources relative to the scale of the problem.
Both of the two countries identified and outlined in Chapter 3 have been through
almost 10 years of development since the identification of a requirement to
establish a mine clearance capacity.

Both responded (or were forced to

respond) in completely different ways and are now at different phases in their
development.
There are many good reasons, culturally, politically and practically as to why the
two countries have developed in such different ways, yet there are also
common threads throughout both these situations.
Whilst the mine action environment is unique, it is not unreasonable to suppose
that there are other situations, outside of the mine action arena, indeed outside
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the humanitarian aid sector, where similar problems occur and where strategic
planning could be applied to optimise future developments.
This chapter will assess the development of organisations in the mine action
arena. It will consider the roles of culture and organisational structures in the
development and consider the strategic planning processes that are (or are
sometimes not) undertaken.
Culture
Culture is a key element in the development of an organisation and the
development of a model needs to keep in mind the diverse influences of culture
on organisations. The classic theorists of organisational theory have attempted
to label the way organisations are designed, run and planned.

From the

“Classical” Approach of Taylor, Urwick, Brech et al, through Mayo and Maslow
and their “Human Relations” approach, to today’s “Contingency approach”
encompassing fundamentals of both types of thinking with a holistic perspective
on the organisation, all theorists have a perspective on the ideal for the
structure of an organisation.
The influences of culture are manifold. Culture can be defined as “intellectual or
moral discipline and training; a state of intellectual and artistic development”ii or
as a “distinctive pattern of values and beliefs which are characteristic of a
particular society or sub-group within that society”iii. Whilst these descriptions in
themselves help us begin to understand what culture is, it is still a very difficult
concept to define.

The way we behave and our previous experiences all

contribute to our reactions to situations – rationality is sometimes difficult to
relate to reality when decisions and processes are analysed. The studies of
organisations by the classicists provide useful ground rules but most of the
studies were undertaken in western societies.

Organisational culture and

norms vary hugely between west and east. Many mine affected countries are
coming out of long periods of time where normal social structure had broken
down (Cambodia being an example where any sense of normality had been
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forcibly removed from every single member of society) or where structures and
systems had been implemented that were completely alien to western society.
In Mozambique for example, all systems post Portuguese departure in 1975
were based around Communist systems being imposed over the extant African
tribal systems.
Many of the difficulties occur when the UN attempts to apply a standard solution
to a problem. Often, that solution will be based on a system or structure that
has been used by a member of the implementing team previously in other
circumstances.

In terms of the area being studied here, the operational

elements of both the ADP and the CMAC are built on classic western military
structures. In these cases the imposition seems to work and both organisations
seem to operate effectively and safely in what is potentially a hazardous
environment. There are however some dangers:
“And you must know this law of culture: two civilisations cannot know
and understand each other well. You will start going deaf and blind. You
will be content in your own civilisation surrounded by the hedge, but
signals from other civilisations will be as incomprehensible to you as if
they had been sent by the inhabitants of Venus.”iv
The imposition of a different set of values on an organisation can be hugely
problematic. In Cambodia for example, in 1993 at the height of the UNTAC
deployment, the average pay of a Government minister was $68/month, and a
deminer earned $125/month. In this case, the whole of CMAC was on the
same upwardly distorted salary scale. In Mozambique in 1995, the head of the
CND was earning a government salary of in the region of $120/month; an ADP
deminer was earning $200/month and the Director of ADP was earning around
$5,000/month.

In cases like this, there are clearly huge difficulties and

government employees (who are also part of the “capacity development”
process) will be handling large amounts of money and may be “disincentivised”
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from keeping the process moving forward at a reasonable speed. This almost
guarantees resentment; it also is an invitation to corruption.
Culture is still a subject strongly debated between experts.

Robins states:

“Most people are unaware just how their culture will affect them. Culture is like
fish to water. It is there all the time but the fish are oblivious to it.”

v

Within

organisations, we find ourselves with a grouping of individuals with widely
different backgrounds, upbringings and beliefs all of who meld together into an
organisation with one corporate goal. In developing countries as well, some of
the influences may be less positive, indeed, some of the actors may well be
operating in competition with the organisational objectives for personal reasons.
In his treatise on international relations, Machiavelli notes:
“There is nothing more difficult to plan… more doubtful of success… nor
more dangerous to manage… than the creation of a new system. For
the innovator has enemies of all who profit by the preservation of the old
way…and merely lukewarm defenders in those who gain by the new.”vi
One suspects that Machiavelli may have had in mind an organisation that was
mono-cultural, but whilst this was written some 500 years ago, there are still
many truisms within and it appears as valid today as it did then.
Technical Advice and Culture Clash
In the early days, the modus operandi of the UN when setting up a MAC or
national institution was to overload the country with expatriates who may or may
not have had experience in setting up similar programmes in other parts of the
word. Mozambique had ONUMOZ and Cambodia had UNTAC. In the early
stages, many of these advisors were military and inexperienced with the
situations they might face in a developing country, particularly ones so
damaged by war. The logic and rationale for such a method may seem clear
but military forces are not always renowned for their cultural sensitivity. This
issue is highlighted in the Brahimi report where the panel state that:
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“United Nations personnel in the field, perhaps more than any others, are
obliged to respect local norms, cultures and practices. They must go out
of their way to demonstrate that respect, as a start, by getting to know
their local environment and trying to learn as much of the local culture
and language as they can. They must behave with the understanding
that they are guests in someone else’s home, however destroyed that
home might be, particularly when the United Nations takes on a
transitional authority role.”vii
There are however a number of militaries who have made a speciality out of
such operations. New Zealand for example has a cadre of officers who have
specialised in the setting up and development of such operations and as such
maintain a certain credibility and skill. For short-term assignees, militaries tend
to assign staff on short durations of 6 months and recognise (off the record) that
their staff tend to draw more from the experience than they give back. The
national and long – term expatriate staff would agree with that assessment
more publicly.

Often a six-month deployment means three months

acclimatising to the culture, perhaps two relatively effective months, followed by
a month winding down prior to return. In these circumstances, it is no wonder
that there is a certain amount of cynicism at the input the military have into
HMA.
Not for profit culture
Another interesting perspective is the dynamics of a not for profit organisation.
Commercial organisations are generally operating with the primary objective of
making money. National Mine Action Programmes are clearly not (although
there are sometimes commercial organisations operating in the arena who may
well work with, or for, these mine action programmes). The differences may be
significant, but Handy suggests that the differences should not be interpreted to
assume that a not for profit organisation should be inefficient.
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“… voluntary organisations are not businesses, but they do have clients, they
provide services and they have to finance themselves in one way or another. It
makes just as much sense to ask a voluntary organisation what its strategy is
as it does to ask a business. It is not sinful to be business-like [authors
emphasis].”viii
In more recent years, the use of strategic planning tools has introduced more
cost-effective, value-added and results-based measures to the humanitarian
arena, something that had not always been a priority for donors. FitzGerald and
Neal suggest that commercial companies offer an efficient business approach
and the diplomatic experience to operate in the humanitarian environmentix and
that these companies can maintain shareholder value, whilst at the same time
catering to the needs of the donors, host governments and local communities
as well. There is a suggestion that NGOs could do well to learn some lessons
from such organisations. In a separate report, Harpviken et al suggest that:
“Even in the NGO sector, many would argue that {commercial companies’}
presence has stimulated efforts to increase cost-effectiveness in the sector
more generally.”x
Miles and Snowxi developed a series of frameworks for organisations against
which comparisons or benchmarking exercises could be undertaken.

These

models examined how organisations adapted to changes in their environment.
Essentially they intended the framework to be used to “describe organisational
behaviours and prescribe alternative directions for change where necessary”.
Miles & Snow categorised the four configurations as: Defender, Prospector,
Analyser and Reactor. A summary of the features of these four types is shown
at table 5-1
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Table 5-1 – Miles & Snow’s Typology

Type
Defender

Essentially Conservative & mature. Enjoys stability and aims
for efficiency.

Management is expert in their own field of

operations and does not strive to operate outside that domain.
Organisation will aggressively defend if it feels threatened
Prospector

Opposite end of scale to defender. Seek innovation but do not
strive for efficiency. Will often cause change for changes sake
in order to exploit the opportunities created.

They look to

operate within a broad and continually developing domain.
Analyser

Operates in both domains.
worlds.

Tries to have the best of both

Develops strong stable base but also seeks

occasionally to act as prospector, looking for opportunities to
exploit.
Reactor

Can identify changes in their environment but does not have
the capacity to respond. Lack structural and managerial ability
to

exploit

changing

environment

and

will

only

make

adjustments if forced to do so.

An alternative benchmarking process has been proposed by Handy who
classified the culture of organisations into four distinct types:xii
•

The club culture

•

The role culture

•

The task culture

•

The person culture

A summary of the four types can be seen at table 5-2
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Table 5-2 – Handy’s Typology

Type
Club

Description
Key to the organisation is one individual, centrally
located.

Could be interpreted as a dictatorship.

At

best based on trust and communication. Thrive when
speed of response and personality are important – in “guerrilla
warfare and politics”. Many club cultures feel nepotistic and too
‘closed’ to those outside.
Formalised

Role

communications,

logical

and rational and follow rules and
procedures.
standards,
evaluation procedures.

Organisation
quality

controls

has
and

Generally found in mature organisations.

Work well in routine, stable and unchanging environment
Task
Evolved in response to speedier change than role but
less individualistic than club. Organisations thrive in
problem solving situations needing more than one person to input.
Person

Stars loosely grouped in an organisation make up the
person type organisation. Individual talent is allimportant. These professionals need to be run on a
loose reign.

Whilst this categorisation of organisations in such simplistic terms may be
somewhat idealistic, the point is that we become adapted to the particular style
or method based often upon more a matter of faith than of logic – in other
words, whichever society we were nurtured within is most likely to be the one
which we feel most comfortable in.
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Unfortunately, it is often the case that the clash between two cultures is
compounded by the organisational design as described above. Someone who
has spent their formative years in a role type organisation will feel
uncomfortable if they then find themselves working within a club type
organisation. Even more difficult to analyse are those persons for whom any of
these working environments are alien.
It seems from experience in the field, that the two more commonly found
structures encountered are the club and role type organisations. Unfortunately,
they often clash with the expatriate technical advisors often coming from typical
role stereotypes and the local institutions having a club culture.
In cross-cultural situations, behaviours can either be attributed to the situation
(i.e. cultural differences) or to the personal characteristics of the individual, such
as laziness, arrogance or disrespect. It is important to understand the cultural
environment in order to make these attributions correctly. Gordon suggests
that:
“For example, managers of a multi-cultural workforce must not equate
poor grammar or mispronunciation with a lack of ability because it often
indicates use of a second language instead.” xiii
This does not bode well for the parachuting in of expatriate technical advisors to
projects where they are not prepared to begin to understand the culture of the
environment to which they are applied.
Planning
Planning processes can also differ significantly based on cultural background.
How for example, does one convince a Khmer who has spent 30 years at war, 3
years under the Khmer Rouge with no guarantees of even the next meal, and
may never have received any formal education that it is essential to draw up
strategic plans for the next 5 years of development of their organisation?
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The western world generally uses a formal structure for planning and it has
been well documented.9

Figure 5-1 places the formal and informal planning

processes side by side as a direct comparison.xiv The formal process provides

Figure 5-1 – Strategic Planning processes

Formal Strategic thinking
Establish Strategic
Direction

Define Strategies

Feedback

Define mission and
objectives. Assess
situation and
options and select.

Achieve Strategies

Feedback

Strategic
planning of
options selected

Implement

Informal Strategic
thinking
what the west considers to be a logical clear process by which the strategic
planner can develop a plan. Establishment of the strategic direction, definition
of strategies and the achievement of those strategies as well as the essential
feedback loops within the process allow for a logical progression from one step
to the next.
Often however, any planning system in place in a less developed country will be
an informal planning process. At the bottom of Figure 5-1 is a representation of
9

Johnson & Scholes are strong proponents of the formal school of Strategic Planning – see “Exploring
Corporate Strategy”, (Prentice Hall Europe, 1999).
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the informal process for strategic planning.

The arrows entering from the

bottom indicate the relatively random and broad inputs into the process that are
applied in an informal culture. Whilst in many situations this thinking “out of the
box” is productive and can benefit the organisation substantially, it is not
necessarily always so. Creative thought and a creative culture however are
often seen as a virtue in western societies, yet in other societies, there is
distinct discouragement to think laterally.
The development of strategy in itself however is not necessarily the be all and
end all. There is an interesting suggestion that, whilst a superior strategy may
be necessary, it is seldom sufficient on its own. Koopman suggests that the key
attributes separating organisations that succeed brilliantly rather than those who
succeed with mediocrity, is usually the execution. The irony, he goes on to say,
is that few strategies are bad, and even fewer are fatal.xv
Even further, Mintzberg suggests that formal planning may not necessarily be
the best way to develop an organisation. He suggests that strategic planning in
itself may actually be overly restrictive in certain organisations.

He says:

“{strategy is} a creative phenomenon that depends more upon redrawing lines
than on respecting them”.xvi His overarching argument is that the formalisation
of strategic planning stifles human creativity and that it is virtually impossible to
make valuable judgement and decisions on purely quantative data. A system
based on emergent planning is recommended by Mintzberg allowing the
creativity of the human mind to be best utilised.
Conclusion
This chapter has considered the influence that culture has on the development
of an organisation and the structural difficulties therein. The problems incurred
with imposition of external values is noted and it is clear that what is required in
the early stages (the emergency stage) of a programme are not necessarily
what is required in the latter stages (the development stage). That juxtaposition
causes difficulties in the smooth development of any programme. That same
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difficulty links to the development of plans and the fundamental philosophical
difference required in this planning between national staff and expatriate staff
whose norms and values may differ significantly.
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Chapter 6
Formalising and integrating the approach
The previous chapters have described the outline of the mine action industry
and explained the problems behind the setting up of national programmes.
Whilst these problems are manifold, they are not insurmountable. This chapter
will consider the benefits of different structures as applied in a number of
programmes and alternatives to the ‘standard’ approach. The importance of
considering the position of the host nation in terms of emergency and
development will also be noted as will the role of staff in the transition of the
programme from emergency to development.
A recent study undertaken for the Swedish government assessing the benefits
attributable to their donations to mine actioni grouped the main options for
setting up a coordinating body into the ‘standard’ UN MAC model, the
government model and the NGO implementation model. The three are studied
briefly here before looking at the wider issues.
Structural environment
In a previous projectii, a stakeholder analysis of the mine action environment
was undertaken.

At the national level, the MAC was identified as a key

stakeholder in the environment. The study suggests that the MAC (assuming
its position as a central body) in a country is: “…one of the few organisations
that is genuinely capable of coordinating the mine action in country” … “the
authority that upholds and monitors mine action organisations against
International Standards” and that the greatest strength of a MAC is: “its ability to
coordinate

activity

across

a

whole

system…it

can

coordinate

other

stakeholders, from NGOs to deminers, and it can coordinate all HMA
activities”.iii
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The report also goes on to note that one of the greatest weaknesses attributed
to most MACs is: “their time of arrival in theatre [sic]” suggesting that detailed
planning is not usually carried out before the deployment of a set up team.
Harpviken et al however, view the problem from a different perspective. They
identify a number of implementation channels for HMA projects. They note that
the most common is the UN MAC concept, but identify two further channels for
implementation within HMA. The second channel they identify is the use of
extant government institutions and the third being the use of commercial
companies.iv They summarise the criticisms and merits of the three alternate
methods of implementation and contend that the NGO option has the greatest
number of advantages because of the NGO’s ability to adapt to the needs of a
particular context. They do however criticise NGOs for their general lack of
capacity building. They summarise by stating:
“Most fundamentally, the strengths and weaknesses of different
implementing channels will vary according to context. In a stable political
situation with legitimate and competent government agencies, the
arguments for NGOs or commercial operators appear to be weak.
NGOs, on the other hand, appear to have been doing a good job in
situations of political turmoil, whilst commercial companies operate best
when there is some degree of political stability.”v
Historically, primarily as a result of the influential DHA study in 1997, the UN in
particular, and a number of other donors, have steered toward the MAC
implementation approach. The emphasis was particularly focussed on allowing
the MAC to pose as a coordinating body, and having the authority to
subcontract

independent

agencies

(NGOs,

commercial

or

possibly

governmental {such as military} organisations) to conduct HMA operations.
This is the direction in which both Cambodia and Mozambique are currently
heading.
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The Government implementation model
The Harpviken study goes on to note that the second channel, implementation
by the government, has had few opportunities to be analysed.

There is a

programme in Nicaragua where the government (with a great deal of assistance
from the Organisation of American States) has assumed virtually all
responsibility for mine action in the country, including prioritisation of tasks,
general HMA coordination and HMA operational implementation (which is
carried out by the Nicaraguan military). A similar situation is also in place in
Columbia.
Although in Nicaragua and Columbia (as well as in the rest of Latin America),
the scale of the mine problem has never reached the scale of the likes of
Cambodia and Afghanistan, this works to some advantage for the national
governments in that it is far simpler to envisage an end state and, as such,
easier to plan accordingly.

However, with around 80 victims per yearvi in

Nicaragua and 243 (although it is worth noting that 105 of those were police or
military) in Columbia in the first 10 months of 2001vii, it is clearly a problem that
governments take seriously.
In Nicaragua, the choice of the government to use the military to carry out
demining operations was not taken by default. Nicaragua took a clear decision
that it wished to effectively take control of its own destiny and NGOs were not
felt to have “added value”. Unfortunately, as the study states:
“Although the military is accountable to the government, the government
is not accountable to anyone. In theory, the NDC {National Demining
Commission} is mandated to control decisionmaking (sic) regarding
priorities. In reality, the NDC lacks the expertise to make decisions and
winds up rubber-stamping government decisions.”viii
It can therefore be seen that there is clearly more than one way to approach a
problem other than the standard template UN solution and this is clearly a key
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factor that needs to be borne in mind during the initiation of a mine action
programme.
The NGO implementation channel
The third method of implementation noted in the study is that of NGO led
programmes and the example of the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) run
programme in Northern Iraq is cited. The study suggests that the benefits of
MAGs flexibility in operating in this environment (albeit that there is no
operational government within the region) and the NGO ability to innovate,
without the sometimes constrictive bureaucracy of a large organisation. There
is some general criticism of lack of capacity building, but the study also notes
that from a start in 1992 where the programme had 14 expatriates, the
programme had scaled down to 4 in 2000.ix
From emergency to development
Critical to the development and structuring of any HMA organisation is the state
of the country at the particular time of implementation – in other words; where
the country falls on the ‘emergency – development continuum;’ whether the
country is considered to be in a state of complex emergency or whether it is
partly through a redevelopment initiation phase is a very significant factor. As
Harpviken et al say:
“Too often, when a situation is defined as an emergency it serves as an
excuse

for

launching

short-sighted

operations,

even

though

consideration of the broader and more long-term implications of an
intervention is no less important in an emergency situation…Additionally,
it is often true that what is first seen as an emergency requires a longterm response. This is indeed the case with HMA. Most cases that have
a dramatic mine problem that can be solved within a short time frame will
also have a more enduring mine problem of a less dramatic character
that will require a long-term, sustainable response.”x
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It seems, therefore, that one of the critical factors impinging on the
implementation of a programme on a country should be that country or region’s
position on the ‘emergency – development continuum’.
Many of the countries that require UN support are right at the beginning of the
continuum and tend to be classified as an emergency operation. In theory, all
UN mine action efforts are coordinated by the UNMAS, which should be
cognisant of the impact of the timing - effectively placing the country on this
continuum. Again, in theory, the UNMAS takes advice from the UNDP Mine
Action Team (MAT) who will advise on precisely this issue and on the
development of a sustainable capacity. This development should consider the
whole range of options, from the basic training of deminers through to creating
capacity at the governmental level (which is where the UNDP focus tends to
be).
The UNDP recognises that there is potential for conflict between the emergency
start-up phase of an operation and attempt to include plans for the development
right from the start. In a recent article, Ian Mansfield, former team leader of the
UNDP MAT, outlined a set of principles that should be adhered to during the
build up and development of a MAC (or indeed a Mine Action Coordination
Centre – MACC).xi
Mansfield notes that capacity building, which is traditionally (within UNDP)
aimed at national and local governmental level, should be applied throughout,
and at all levels of, mine action activity.

He produced a model of how he

envisaged a National Mine Action Structure should be. This is reproduced at
Figure 6-1
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Figure 6-1 - Proposed National Mine Action Structure
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It is however worth reinforcing the Harpviken quote: “Additionally, it is often true
that what is first seen as an emergency requires a long-term response.”xii Yet
again, the importance of differentiating between emergency and development,
and at all levels, is emphasised.
Management perspectives
Perhaps one of the other problems is the significant difference of management
styles required for running an emergency operation as opposed to a
developmental programme.

In the emergency phase, management style is

required to be ‘hands-on’; inspirational; and could be classified as a ‘Prospector’
or ‘Club’ type styles.

As the continuum moves on, the requirement for

management style shifts across to a requirement for a ‘Defender’ or ‘Role’ type
organisations. One of the difficulties is of course recognising the requirement to
make the shift, and indeed, to changing the culture of the organisation to allow
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this to happen. Of course it may be impractical to change the whole staff of an
organisation after a relatively short period of time, but it may be necessary to
change some of the key players. Unfortunately it is often those key players who
need to make the decisions to change and it is quite likely that this will not be a
decision that comes easily. Fitzgerald and Neal recognise this when they say:
“An operation may start as an international emergency and as such, agencies
may take whatever measures are deemed necessary.

However, as the

situation progresses, the emphasis in skills may move from technical to
management.”xiii
The deployment of international military advisors into the setting up of a new
organisation fits reasonably well into this model. Albeit the military tend to be of
a ‘Defender’ or ‘Role’ type people by the nature of their organisations, the
individuals tend to be flexible enough to set up a reactive, ‘Prospector’ type
organisation.
The role of the military is also considered in the Brahimi report, which
recommends the UN consider greater use of the military in PKOs. The UN
Standby Assistance System (UNSAS) maintains an ‘on call’ capability to deploy
military (as well as police and specialised civilian assets) within 7, 14, 30, 60 or
90 days notice.

The report recommends augmentating the existing

arrangements.xiv At first glance this seems to make sense. Whilst UNMAS do
not currently have a formal role within the UNSAS, they have made a number of
recommendations to DPKO (who oversee the UNSAS) and the UNSAS will in
future, if required, include an emergency logistics support capacity including a
number of demining ‘kits’ for rapid deployment from the UN logistics base in
Brindisi.xv What must never be forgotten however is the input of UNDP in the
planning and deployment process. It is interesting to note that the UNDP MAT
in New York now consists completely of specialists who have no intimate
experience of military systems and modus operandi. This is certainly no bad
thing, but conversely, UNMAS need to recognise their lack of expertise in the
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developmental sector and perhaps even consider expanding their skills base to
include more of a focus on developmental issues.
The Brahimi recommendation fits relatively comfortably with the current UNMAS
plans for the development of a rapid reaction response team.

The rapid

Reaction Plan (RRP), currently under development by UNMAS is planned to
enable UNMAS to ensure an: “effective, proactive and coordinated response to
landmine contamination in both humanitarian emergency situations, and
insupport of peacekeeping operations.”xvi On a positive note, it is encouraging
to see that the RRP calls for the UNDP to be responsible for: “participat{ion} in
discussions regarding longer-term capacity building activities.”xvii
One further point to note is the selection of expatriates sent as advisors or
programme managers. In the early stages, the great majority of these positions
were selected on their technical (and often specialist EOD) skills. Whilst there
is increasing recognition that these skills are not necessary to advise on the
structure, set up and development of programmes, it seems that this has taken
time to filter down to the ground. Still, many of the current technical advisors
are former military officers with a technical focus. In the emergency stage of an
operation, this does no harm at all; indeed it may well be beneficial. Where the
real problem begins however, is the continuation of these staff into the deep
developmental stage and the UN (MAS, OPS and DP) need to consider
expanding the pool of development specialists within mine action. This is not to
say that all technicians are unable to make the transition to viewing the situation
from a developmental perspective, merely that it may be simpler to find the right
skills in the first place.
Conclusion
The debate over the best structure for a national programme remains. UN,
NGO or governmental structures all have their place depending upon their
position along the emergency – development continuum. In addition to the
structure required depending on the continuum, the management requirement
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varies significantly as well. Early stages require ‘doers’ and later stages require
‘developers’ – something that does not seem to have received the full attention
of the planners thus far.
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Chapter 7
Lessons learned in Lebanon
The intention of this chapter is to look at the initiation of a very recent
programme and analyse how any lessons learned from previous experience
were noted and applied in this process. The very recent development of mine
action in Lebanon since 1999, when the Government of Lebanon (GOL) first
established a structured national body (the National Demining Office {NDO}),
will be used as a model. The more general background to the development of
Lebanon has already been given in chapter four and the following section aims
to develop on that and analyse the lessons learned from the Lebanon
programme.
UN Assessment Missions and results
There have been a number of UN assessment missions in Lebanon over recent
years. In 1999, an interagency mission led by UNMAS proposed a MACC to be
formed as part of UNIFIL.

A mission by UNMAS immediately prior to the

formation of the UNIFIL MACC consolidated this in 2000.
The 2000 mission recommended a three-phase procedure to initiate the
programmei and a suggested a detailed breakdown of the support provided
which is shown at Annex E.ii The concept of the 2000 mission was to develop a
coordinated national response, “under the guidance of the personal
representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the UN Resident
Coordinator and the Force Commander UNIFIL” and emphasised that “the
programme will focus on what can realistically be achieved in the short term to
accelerate mine action on the ground and to enhance the national capacity to
provide a medium-to-longer term sustainable response.”

iii

The three phases of

the UNIFIL MACC were:
1. The establishment, mine awareness and liaison phase. This initial
phase was planned to take up to the end of 2001 and, although this was
achieved, there were problems along the way. There were a number of
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NGOs (particularly those working within the mine awareness {now known
as Mines Risk Education – MRE}) already working in Lebanon, who had
difficulty with the imposition of a coordinating agency. This had already
proved to be a problem in both Cambodia and Mozambique during the
establishment of CMAA and CND/IND.

In Lebanon, it should

theoretically have been easier to implement this regime because the
NGOs had not been established for a great period of time. As an aside,
most NGOs would state that they fully support coordination-based
policies. Nonetheless, in the early stages, this difficulty created extra
work for the recently established UNIFIL MACC
2. Consolidation Phase.

The programme would build upon the

developments of Phase 1 by continuing to develop the emergency mine
action plan to facilitate the safe return of Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs), and enhance the mobility of UNIFIL troops.

The actual

implementation of phase 2 was again problematic and it was at this stage
that the coordination between the national authority, the NDO, and the
UN MACC became a major issue.
The NDO at this point began to open up their relationship with the UNIFIL
MACC in Tyre. The NDO had recently received a technical advisor, who
reported to the head of the NDO and to the UNDP resident representative in
Lebanon.

The advisor also received policy guidance and technical

backstopping from the UNDP MAT in New York. The appointment of this
position meant that the relationship opportunities between the two agencies
were expanded and national planning began to be seriously considered.
There was however still some difficulty between the GOL and the UN and
the liaison was far from perfect.
3. The final phase of the project. This phase was to assist in the
development of a medium to long-term mine action response to rid South
Lebanon of mines, UXOs, and booby-traps. The mine action assets
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established during the previous phases would then be integrated into a
national mine action programme managed by the GOL, coordinated
through the NDO and supported by the UNDP.
By this stage relationships between the NDO and UNIFIL MACC had
improved to the point where the two organisations were prepared to begin
working on the development of a national plan. This plan was presented to
the GOL in May 2001. In addition the UNIFIL MACC programme manager
was tasked to begin detailed planning of the integration of the OAE project.
The GOL, UN and UAE ratified the subsequent MOU in October 2001 and
almost immediately began the process of developing the UNIFIL MACC
with the UAE funded positions inside the organisation. One of the primary
reasons for the positive way that the UAE moved forward in the integration
into the UNIFIL MACC was its desire that all its operations be carried out in
accordance with the recently introduced International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS), the development of which was led by the UN. The UAE
thus saw the UN as the key to implementing operations in accordance with
IMAS.
Once the MOU was signed between the UAE, GOL & The UN, the UAE
then began the process of issuing tender documents for the operational
work to be funded by them.

They dealt with this contracting process

themselves, outside of the UNIFIL MACC, although the NDO and the UN
MACC were informed of developments. In addition, the UAE went through
the UNIFIL MACC to ask the assistance of the UNOPS Mine Action Unit in
New York, to contract for the quality assurance and monitoring of the work
they contracted out.iv
The shift from UNIFIL MACC to the South Lebanon MACC
In February 2001, a high level mission consisting of the chiefs of both UNMAS
and UNDP recommended moving the UNIFIL MACC away from UNIFIL and
strengthening the relationship with the NDO. This mission recognised that a
national capacity (in the form of the NDO) did already exist, but that its area of
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operations did not extend to the south of the country, where it was becoming
apparent that there was a significant humanitarian problem.

The mission

recommended a strategy, of which the two objectives were to:
•

“ensure the acceleration of mine action operations, particularly in the
south.

•

assist the Government of Lebanon in strengthening its capacity in all
areas of mine action.”v

This shift occurred over the course of 2001 until the UNIFIL MACC effectively
ceased to exist and the organisation became the South Lebanon MACC (the
final ‘c’ shifting meaning to centre in recognition of its increased role).
Capacity Building
One of the less positive elements of this phase was the planned capacity
building element. The UNDP had been working towards the development of a
“capacity building” position within the NDO to aid the long-term viability and
national ownership of the coordination process.

Unfortunately, the politics

within the NDO made this extremely difficult and the advisor found it virtually
impossible to make any headway in the development of a long-term national
capacity. As the UN MACC annual report for 2001 states:
“UNDP was facing difficulty in achieving the desired partnership with the
NDO for this project and by year’s end it looked most likely that the
capacity building support project would be withdrawn. While this would
not stop the UN MACC’s immediate and intermediate term objectives it
would require a rescheduling of the UN MACC exit strategy and re-think
on how best to achieve any sort of integration with the NDO.”vi
As a result of this, the advisor was not replaced at the end of his contract at the
end of 2001. The perspective of the GOL was that there was little need for
assistance for long-term capacity development and the perspective of the
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UNDP was that there was little value in staffing this position in the absence of a
receptive national counterpart.vii
In early 2002, a key personality with the NDO was replaced, and as a result, the
approach of the GOL long-term capacity development shifted to a much more
forward thinking position and at this time, plans are being made to fill the
position of “capacity development” technical advisor, supported by the UNDP in
the NDO.viii
The most significant breakthrough however has been the establishment of a
more open and cooperative dialogue with the NDO that had previously been
very protective of its role and mandate. During the earlier stages in the
development of the UNIFIL MACC it had been made clear that the NDO did not
support the establishment of it and it appeared that they felt threatened by the
existence of the UNIFIL MACC. Over time many of the negative perceptions
held by the NDO toward the UNIFIL MACC have been changed as a more open
and transparent working relationship has developed. This relationship will be
further strengthened in 2002 as the strengthened MACC in South Lebanon
takes shape..ix
Lessons learned from previous set-ups
The UNIFIL MACC in Southern Lebanon was initiated some 10 years after the
organisations in Cambodia and Mozambique.

Although the institutional

structures were different in all cases, it is important to assess just how effective
this implementation has been and what mistakes were made along the way.
The Eaton et al DHA study undertaken in 1997 outlined a number of
conclusions and recommendations (see Annex D). Although clearly not all of
these conclusions are relevant to the development of a programme in Lebanon,
and there are individual elements of the new programme there that require
special attention, it is worth attempting to reconcile some of these.
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Recommendation number eight suggests that:
“… the UN should take a proactive role in needs assessment, planning
and, when necessary, the creation of Mine Action Centres. This should
include assistance with resource mobilization and the development of
skills needed to ensure continuity and sustainability. Support should be
provided in a manner which will allow for a seamless transition between
the initiation and consolidation phases.”x
In the case of Lebanon, the assessment and planning elements were
successfully undertaken with the formation of the UNIFIL MACC.

It seems

however that the development of a successful link to the government structure,
as well as the evolution of a viable capacity development plan and exit strategy
(in other words the implementation of the consolidation phase) was not carried
out successfully and the UNIFIL MACC was established without the genuine
support of the national authorities. Whilst UNMAS did write to the GOL to open
a dialogue, the GOL did not reply and UNMAS did not follow up in this issue
and thus no formal agreement was put in place.xi
A “lessons learned” report issued to UNOPS from the UNIFIL MACC in January
2001 proposes that: “{in future projects} The Project must be approved, or at
least supported by, the Host Government.”xii. Clearly in this case, it would have
been much more effective if the support of the GOL were obtained before
implementation of the UNIFIL MACC, even though it were initially within the
UNIFIL mandate and, as such, not technically required to obtain this authority.
The lack of coordination between the NDO and the UNIFIL MACC produced
considerable problems in the early stages of the programme.
The same report identified a problem in the coordination at the headquarters
(New York) level. The report stated that:
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“UNMAS, if establishing a project in country, must ensure that it
adequately consults with all interested parties in the host country. It is
important that duplication of effort is avoided and that there are no
misunderstandings as to the purpose and roles of the various agencies
or organisations.

In the case of Lebanon, the US Government had

assisted the Government of Lebanon with the establishment of the
National Demining Office. The UNMAS Project was not incorporated into
the development plans of the NDO and hence there exists some
confusion between US objectives, NDO objectives, UNDP objectives,
and the UN MACC.”xiii
Clearly this should be a fundamental element in the planning of any particular
programme and seems to have failed in the case of the UNIFIL MACC.
More positively, the Eaton et al DHA study also specified a number of other
issues that they felt strongly should be implemented.

There are a number

which appear to have been adopted and which, it could be argued, have
contributed significantly to the development of a relatively successful
programme. Two of these in particular are worth noting:
RECOMMENDATION ONE:

“In

line

with

its

central

coordination

responsibilities, the MAC will generally be responsible for planning, for a
central data bank on minefield information, for resource mobilization, for
monitoring, and overall programme development {…} It should also act as
the country’s regulatory agency”.xiv
Whilst the UNIFIL MACC is in an exceptional situation, with a responsibility only
for a specific region of the country (i.e., South Lebanon within UNIFILs area of
operations), it coordinates all MA activities within this area. The UNIFIL MACC
in addition maintained a central database (Information Management System for
Mine Action – IMSMA) which is now closely coordinated with the NDO, who
now operate IMSMA for the rest of the country. Probably the most successful

7-7

element within these recommendations is that of regulation and accreditation of
operational capacities.

Within the remit of OES, the UN MACC is fully

responsible, through the NDO, for the accreditation and coordinating of
operational assets within South Lebanon with the NDO being responsible for
the formal licensing of these assets
RECOMMENDATION TWO: “Donor nations that choose to fund NGOs and
commercial entities directly should do so through a tripartite agreement
involving the donor, the implementing agency, and the Mine Action Centre.
This will facilitate coordination and ensure adherence to standards”.xv
Again, this has proved to be a great success.

OES pledged to fund the

implementation of up to US$50 million of operational support through the
UNIFIL MACC and have provided a number of key positions with the
organisation. Even more positively, the UAE (clearly supported by the UN)
insisted on the application of the recently introduced IMAS on all mine action
activities to be carried out in the country under their funding remit. This is in
itself a huge step forward and supports and reinforces the UN (and the
practitioners in the community) in their desire to regulate the industry into a
professional standards led industry.
RECOMMENDATION THREE:

“The MAC should take a proactive role

in ensuring that expatriate Technical Advisers have appropriate
qualifications and skills needed for the task of training and transfer of
knowledge. Similarly, an effort must be made to avoid the rapid turnover
of personnel involved in training activities. All such personnel should be
available for a minimum of 12 months and, preferably, for 24 months”.xvi
This is another area where the UN MACC has proved to be a success. The key
advisor, the Chief Technical Advisor, has been in place since the beginning of
the programme in July 2000 and has remained in place.

He is eminently

qualified, having taken another programme through a difficult developmental

7-8

stage. Similarly placed is the advisor for information management, a Somali
whose skills and cultural approach are well placed for the situation.
Lebanon’s unique perspective
Clearly the unique circumstances in Lebanon, with the separation of South
Lebanon from the government’s programme, caused difficulties, but it does
allow the two organisations to operate side by side with a certain amount of
complimentarity yet focus on their particular areas. The NDO, operating
throughout the country, with the exception of the South, have focussed on data
gathering and are coordination two survey projects (Landmine impact survey
and a technical survey) which will enable a much clearer picture of the mine
problem in Lebanon to be reached. These surveys will also cover the South
and will assist the MACC.

The MACC on its part, has focussed on the

application of standards and the coordination of efforts in the south, together
with the coordination of the OES project.
Such hybrid projects may well be implemented again in other locations,
particularly in the context of a competent and stable government.

In this

particular case, UNMAS led on the development and seemed not to be
particularly cognisant of the UNDP input.

In future cases, these liaisons

between the two agencies need to be reinforced.

One of the major opportunities in Lebanon has been the development of the
relationship between the three agencies involved. In many programmes, the
problems in the development of relationships between a national government
and the UN are difficult enough. The potential for problems within Lebanon,
with the involvement of an additional government (the UAE) were therefore
increased significantly.

Yet, although there have been significant obstacles

along the way, the status of the programme(s) at the moment demonstrate that
it is possible to achieve a successful organisation within such constraining
circumstances. In this particular case, much of the success can be put down to
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the general selection of technical advisors with the right skills set, although
there were exceptions.
It is also interesting to consider where the national government is on the
“emergency – development continuum”. In both Cambodia and Mozambique,
the development of CMAC/CMAA/CND/IND/ADP was all undertaken under
relatively ineffective governments at the time. In these cases, the UN took the
lead without too much concern over the influence of the governments and with
inadequate reference (in hindsight) to it, and focussed on both initiating the
programme and looking at the longer-term development of the programme,
combined with the wider UN position of supporting the incremental development
of the country. In more recent cases, it may not necessarily be the case that a
programme is set up under a weak government. Lebanon, for example, has
(and had during the initiation phase) a very capable government whose major
problem was their inability to fund demining operations in their country. The
same goes for Eritrea, where a recent UN programme was established within a
country with a strong, effective and coordinated government and a recently
initiated UN MACC.10

The difference seems to be that in Cambodia and

Mozambique, the steps along the emergency – development continuum were
taken sequentially, whereas with the strong governments of Lebanon and
Eritrea, the steps taken overlapped.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and recommendations
This study has analysed the mine action environment and a number of
programmes within it. It has looked at the development of mine action over the
last 13 years and how, although certain elements of the mine action arena have
changed, there are still a number of areas which do not seem to have
developed in the right direction. The recent introduction of the International
Mine Action Standards (IMAS) has been a significant driver for technical change
in the industry as well as directing the quality issues within mine action. IMAS is
a quality based series of documents and allows the national authorities some
flexibility in the initiation of programmes although ultimately the national
authority of the country of implementation will have the final say in any
programme.
•

The first chapter outlined the structure of the study and identified the
aims and objectives as well as defining the methodology.

•

Chapter two presented a brief history and overview of the mine action
environment and outlined how the humanitarian community has begun to
attempt to overcome this appalling global problem that has emerged over
the last 13 years. The role of the UN, the key body involved in global
mine action is explained as is the basic structure of the key agencies
involved in mine action; UNMAS, UNDP and UNOPS.

•

Chapter three analyses the literature that is available, from the general
humanitarian and developmental perspective, through to specific
publications looking at particular countries and programmes.

The

chapter then considers a number of previous studies that have analysed
the

management

structures

of

organisations.
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mine

action

programmes

and

•

Chapter four develops case studies of two specific countries – Cambodia
and Mozambique – and outlines the development of the programmes
therein and the influences that caused their development in their
particular direction. The chapter assesses the mine action programmes
in the two countries and the fact that they were both initiated under very
different circumstances and therefore shaped in significantly different
ways, yet over the last ten years, have emerged to be shaped into
remarkably similar national structures.

In contrast to Cambodia and

Mozambique, addition, the chapter gives a brief history of the relatively
recent development of the mine action environment in Lebanon, which
was then expanded upon in chapter seven.
•

Chapter five considers the external influences placed upon national
programmes and how programmes have addressed such influences. In
particular, the cultural difficulties between expatriate advisors and
national staff are identified.

Several benchmarking processes for

organisational structures are analysed, and existing mine action
programmes considered against these models.
assesses

how

planning

processes

vary

Finally this chapter

depending

on

cultural

background and the difficulties of operating in a culturally alien
environment.
•

Chapter six draws on a number of structural environments that could be
applied in the development of a national mine action programme and
goes on to discuss the differences and difficulties inherent within the
position along the emergency – development continuum.

•

Chapter seven draws together the various issues raised during the
course of the study and looks at how some of the lessons learned in
previous studies have been utilised in the initiation phase of a relatively
new programme in Lebanon.
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A global model?
Whilst the concept of a global model of a mine action programme may at first
sight seem to be attractive, it has become apparent from the research
undertaken that the development and attempted application of standard model
would, in reality, be neither applicable, nor welcome due to the huge amount of
external influences involved.
There are however indicators that can be drawn from the stage of development
of the country and its position along the emergency – development continuum
that can and should be used for the more formal structuring of any future mine
action programme.
What is perhaps more positive is the development that mine action has
undertaken in the last 13 years. From questionable beginnings, the industry is
developing towards becoming a quality driven environment, which offers huge
opportunities for humanitarian relief.
formalisation and standardisation.

Steps are being taken towards

Several examples can be given.

The

virtually global usage of the standardised UN initiated Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) by the vast majority of mine action
programmes throughout the world give a benchmark for the management of
data on all aspects of landmines in a structured and consistent way.
In addition, one further standardised initiative deserves mention.

In the

formative days of mine action, there was general recognition of the fact that
whilst at least some of the mine action advisors moving into programmes had a
formal education and understanding of management structures, very few of the
national staff had the benefit of such an education. This realisation, coupled
with a desire to improve the quality of management, and therefore incrementally
the quality of mine action programmes, resulted in the successful preparation
and delivery of a number of structured and consistent management training
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courses, starting in 2000.

Interestingly enough, when the idea was initially

mooted in 1997, there was a great deal of scepticism in many circles, within and
without the UN.

Since a series of courses was started, run by Cranfield

University for UNDP, the critics have realised the benefits and the courses are
now widely held up to be a great success.
Both these two initiatives in particular have resulted in a much more
standardised environment in the global mine action community which should
provide a catalyst for future improvement through the sharing of experience,
knowledge and expertise.
Recommendations
From analysis of the study thus far, it is apparent that the recommendations fall
into three mutually complementary categories.
•

INTEGRATION

•

CULTURE

•

APPROPRIATENESS

It is recommended that the following principle factors should be considered prior
to implementation of future mine action programmes:

INTEGRATION
•

Emphasis is placed on improving the liaison between the UN agencies
involved in mine action.

•

Greater importance is given to the inclusion of UNDP in the early
planning stages of new programmes where UNMAS have the lead
because of peacekeeping operations mandates.
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•

UNMAS, together with UNDP, consider closer and more formal
integration into the UN SAS to support DPKO in rapid deployment to
peace support operations that may require the involvement of mine
action assets.

•

More consideration is given to coordinating with other humanitarian
agencies and NGOs operating within and without the mine action sector.

CULTURE
•

From day one of the initiation of any new programme, in whatever form,
priority is given to the integration of the mine action programme into the
national structure. If such a structure does not exist, the programme
should be designed such that it will be possible to easily integrate into a
national structure if and when this commences.

•

Selection criterion for expatriate advisors are expanded to consider
greater cultural awareness, ability and willingness to adapt to a local
culture.

•

Military advisors in UN PKO are given clearer guidance on appropriate
behaviour and management styles.

APPROPRIATENESS
•

Better selection of expatriate technical advisors should be considered as
a priority, based on their organisational, developmental and management
skills rather than their technical background.

•

Consideration is given to the widening of UNMAS’ base of staff with
developmental experience.
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•

Greater notice is taken of where the country to be operated in is situated
on the emergency – development continuum.

•

Greater involvement is given to the consideration of longer-term
development planning even during the emergency stage – with emphasis
on increasing the input from UNDP where applicable.

Further areas for study
•

There is a need for a detailed study to be carried out to assess more
accurately how the various influences bearing on a mine action
programme impact upon the best means of structuring that programme.
Placing the country upon the emergency – development continuum may
be a significant step forward but a clear understanding of how the
multiple other influences bear on this process would be valuable.

•

A study to consider the best strategy for expatriates operating closely
with national staff in diverse cultures would be worth considering in an
attempt to ease the difficulties that appear to be prevalent in many
countries.

•

A detailed study of the interaction of all the UN agencies involved in
mine action, in particular the key agencies of UNMAS, UNDP and
UNOPS, would be of benefit in continuing to develop the slowly
improving relationships between the agencies.

•

Further study is merited in the area of governmental control and
implementation of mine action centres and also the transfer of UN
initiated programmes across to governmental structures.
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•

There is a need for a detailed analysis of how technical advisors transfer
their skills across to their national counterparts. There is currently little
rigour applied to the training and skills transfer that expatriate advisors
offer to national staff and if it is successful, it is often by luck rather than
judgement. A vague work plan may not be the most effective way to
monitor and evaluate this process.

Conclusions
The world of humanitarian mine action has undergone a sea change since the
first operations were undertaken in Afghanistan in 1989.

Beginning with a

group of people who were keen to help, but had no concept as to the scale or
humanitarian and developmental impact of the problem, the industry has
transformed itself into a quality driven, standards based professional
humanitarian industry which has resulted in a great improvement in the quality
of life for many hundreds of thousands of people living in mine affected
countries.

From a small group of people working from a makeshift office,

though to current organisations with thousands of employees, turning over tens
of millions of dollars per year, professionalisation has been the focus of
development for the industry.
Whilst this professionalism can only be applauded, during the early
development of the industry, operational issues and humanitarian concerns
tended to be the major focus, often overriding good management practices.
This is understandable, yet good management practices will bolster the
effectiveness of programmes and can only benefit the industry in the long term.
This study considers a key part of the whole implementation process and
identifies a number of areas requiring further study. It recognises that there can
be no boilerplate solution for implementation of a programme, yet identifies that
there is benefit in gaining a more detailed understanding of what is required to
implement effective programmes.
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If the mine action industry can evolve as rapidly and successfully over the next
13 years as it has over the past 13, the impact of landmines may be
ameliorated with more cost effective solutions and effective programmes,
together with the development of a national management capacity to assist the
development of those nations less fortunate than our own.
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Roles and Responsibilities of UN Agencies in Mine Action

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) {KEY AGENCY}
UNMAS is the focal point for all mine-related activities. It is responsible for
ensuring a coordinated response to landmine contamination, establishing
priorities for assessment missions and coordinating the mobilisation of
resources.

It is also responsible for the preparation and maintenance of

technical standards, the collection and maintenance of mine related data,
advocacy in support of a global ban on mines and for the management of the
Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) which is the central fund to which donors channel
their funds through the UN system for mine action.

The UN Development Programme (UNDP) {KEY AGENCY}
UNDP is the focus for the establishment of national and local capacity and
addressing the socio-economic consequences of mine contamination. UNDP
will normally have the prime responsibility for the development of integrated,
sustainable mine action programmes where programmes have passed the
“emergency” stage.

The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) {KEY AGENCY}
UNOPS is a service provider for integrated mine action and capacity building
programmes. It implements programmes as appropriate in conjunction with the
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concerned partners (such as UNMAS, UNDP etc,).

UNOPS is the Agency

responsible for recruitment of international staff of programmes. In addition,
UNOPS coordinate and manage a programme in Northern Iraq paid for by the
“Food for Oil” agreement between the UN and the Iraqi Government with a
budget of £45 million between 1997 and 2000.

The UN Children’s fund (UNICEF)
UNICEF is the focal point for Mines Risk Education (MRE), one of the “five
pillars” of mine action.

Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA)
DDA are responsible for disarmament issues and focal point for the Ottawa
treaty implementation.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)
UNOCHA works to consider the humanitarian implications of the landmine
problem, which feeds into policy planning processes.

World Health Organisation (WHO)
WHO advises on public health consequences of landmines.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
UNHCR are responsible for refugee/Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) safety in
mine affected countries.
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World Food Programme (WFP)
WFP offer food assistance and agricultural development and provide useful
mechanisms for coordination in mine affected areas.

World Bank
The World Bank finances development and reconstruction initiatives.
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UNMAS
UNMAS

UNIFIL

UNIFIL

UNIFIL

UNIFIL

9
10

11

12

13

UN SUPPORT
PACKAGE

Mined area Marking

UNMAS

8

14

Victim Assistance

UNMAS

7

ALL ACTIVITIES

Mine Awareness

Emergency Clearance

MACC Operations UNIFIL AO
Level Two Survey
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Version 2
Direct Support to UNIFIL

UNICEF
UNESCO
WHO

4
5
6

ACTIVITY
(c)
Capacity Building Support to the
NDO
QA/QC Support to NDO
Mine Awareness including support to
NDO
Victim Assistance
Mine Awareness
Victim Assistance

UNDP
UNICEF

UN AGENCY
(b)
UNDP

2
3

SERIAL
(a)
1
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$2,439,000

$50,000
To be allocated to UNIFIL for Mine
Awareness, Victim Assistance,
Marking
$342,000
$500,000
50% Co-funded by Government of
Norway
Activities funded through current
UNIFIL Budget
To be funded through UNMAS
Allocation
To be funded through UNMAS
Allocation
To be part- funded through UNMAS
Allocation

$50,000
To be funded through MACC Budget

$250,000
$220,000
$30,000

$480,000
$245,000

$272,000

FUNDING
(d)

COMMENCING APRIL
2001

April – July 2001

April – July 2001

April – July 2001

April– July 2001

Funded to 30 June 2001
10 months commencing
April/May 2001

April – July 2001

April – May 2001

12 months
12 months
12 months

8 months
12 months

TIMEFRAME
(e)
12 months

UN STRATEGY OF SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION IN LEBANON

As for Serial 10

$5,000 As for Serial 10

$5,000 As for serial 10

Funding to December 2001 to be confirmed
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) UK has been given a
grant to conduct this activity by the European
Community.
Time frame indicates current mandate period.

Funding to be confirmed. Method of allocation to be
confirmed.

Funding not yet secured.
Plus additional $50,000 support costs including activities
in Serial 3.
Funding not yet secured.
Funding not yet secured.
$300,000 allocated to health care training in
collaboration with AGFUND. $30,000 for direct action
victim assistance.
Currently under assessment and procurement action

REMARKS
(f)
Funding not yet secured
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Summary of recommendations from UN DHA multi-country
study 1997
Measurement of the Socio-Economic Impact of Mines.
1. A more structured approach should be taken by the United Nations and its
partners to document and analyse the impact of mines on civilian life and the
way in which social and economic activity is hindered or rendered impossible as
a result of mine warfare. Resources should be made available to improve data
collection and analysis on the socio-economic impact of mines.
2. The UN, in collaboration with all concerned parties, should mobilize
resources for the development of a simplified methodology to measure the
impact of mines on poverty and on the coping mechanisms of affected
communities.
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines
3. As a supporter of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the UN focal
point for landmines should monitor ongoing conflicts, to the extent that this is
appropriate and feasible, and use its position to influence all concerned parties
to cease the use of mine warfare. This should include action to identify
suppliers of such weapons.
4. Directors of all UN-supported mine action programmes should ensure that all
their staff are fully familiar with the Secretary-General’s position on landmines
and should not, in their official duties, advocate against the ICBL.
5. The UN should explore all available opportunities to work with mine-affected
countries to develop legal frameworks inhibiting the stockpiling and use of
landmines.
UN Support for Mine Action Programmes
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6. The mandate of the United Nations focal point for landmines should be
affirmed and supported by all concerned entities of the United Nations system.
Such a mandate includes advocacy for a total ban on the use, manufacture,
trade, and stockpiling of landmines and on behalf of landmine survivors. This
mandate should also include responsibility for analysing the use and impact of
landmines and helping ensure that peace negotiations address the issue of
landmines.
7. The UN focal point for landmines should develop specific mechanisms to
ensure that an appropriate exchange of information and cross-fertilization occur
between programmes. Activities already undertaken in this connection, such as
the Landmines Newsletter and Global Database, should be strengthened and
expanded.
8. In terms of helping affected countries address the immediate and long-term
consequences of landmines, the UN should take a proactive role in needs
assessment, planning and, when necessary, the creation of Mine Action
Centres. This should include assistance with resource mobilization and the
development of skills needed to ensure continuity and sustainability. Support
should be provided in a manner which will allow for a seamless transition
between the initiation and consolidation phases. The UN focal point should take
an active role in ongoing development and promotion of operational and safety
standards. It should monitor the application of new technologies and should
facilitate an exchange of expertise between programmes.
9. Given the difficulties inherent in the application of UN rules and regulations in
crisis situations the UN focal point should not get directly involved in the
implementation of field activities. It should contract out specific tasks and
projects to UN bodies not bound by UN Secretariat Rules and Regulations, to
national and international NGOs, or to commercial firms. DPKO, UNOPS and
UNDP collaboration in the organization of contractual arrangements should be
periodically reviewed and steps taken to maximize effectiveness.
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Delineation of Responsibility Between Humanitarian and Operational Mine
Action Activities
10. Given inherent time constraints and the difficulties which have been
encountered in trying to ensure that activities launched to meet operational
mission objectives form the basis for an indigenous long-term capacity, there
should be a delineation of responsibility, authority and budgetary resources for
all activities related to “humanitarian” and “operational” mine action initiatives.
This in effect means that “operational” mine action activities such as the
clearance of major routes or other areas needed to facilitate the deployment
and movement of mission personnel will be undertaken under the direct
authority of the Force Commander utilizing mission resources. All “operational”
mine action activities should, however, be undertaken in close consultation with
the Mine Action Centre or coordination mechanism established for the purpose
of organizing a national programme to ensure that all UN activities are mutually
supportive. In this connection, the UN focal point should ensure that all Force
Commanders and their staff are fully briefed on the different requirements of
“operational” and “humanitarian” mine action and the support needed to develop
indigenous capabilities.
National Authority
11. The United Nations should facilitate the creation of a national mine action
authority with an appropriate mandate and composition. The purpose of a
national authority is to ensure that mine action activities have an appropriate
governance body. In general, the authority’s mandate will include overall
responsibility for broad policy guidance, selection of the Executive Director of
the Mine Action Centre and appointment of external auditors. It should also
ensure that periodic independent evaluations are undertaken. The mine action
authority would normally ensure that a portion of the national budget is made
available annually for the country’s mine action activities. The authority should
ensure that mine action policy is non-partisan and is in accord with
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humanitarian considerations including the allocation of resources to address the
mine-related problems of those who are most vulnerable.
The Mine Action Centre
12. The UN focal point should take a proactive role in the creation of a Mine
Action Centre. The core function of such a Centre is to ensure that programme
activities give effect to established policy. This necessarily involves the
development of an overall plan and ensuring that a coherent and
comprehensive approach is pursued in a safe and cost-effective manner. In
line with its central coordination responsibilities, the MAC will generally be
responsible for planning, for a central data bank on minefield information, for
resource mobilization, for monitoring, and overall programme development
including the investigation of accidents and follow up activities. It should also
act as the country’s regulatory agency.

Operational Modalities
13. The study team strongly recommends in favour of distinct
coordination and implementation arrangements. Operational activities
should be undertaken by independently managed mine action agencies
(such as national and international NGOs) under contract to the MAC.
The MAC should not become directly involved in implementation
activities but retain overall control through sound contractual
arrangements. This approach puts less strain on human resources at the
centre in terms of management and control capabilities. It is more
transparent for donors and more responsive to shifting priorities and
demand as the mine problem is brought under control and the level of
activities decrease over the years. There are situations, however, where
the vertical integration approach will be the option preferred by the
national authorities. If the mine action authority and the MAC determine
to directly execute operations in the field then the central management
structure must be considerably enlarged to provide management and
logistical support to units in the field.
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Early Collection of Data
14. In many situations of protracted or sporadic conflict, or where parts of a
country are stabilized, information, for example on population displacement due
to mines, is one indicator of the need for future mine action activities. The UN
should take a more proactive approach in collecting and analyzing available
information on the presence of landmines in situations likely to harm civilians.
Multi-Disciplinary Assessment
15. The UN focal point should systematically undertake a multi-disciplinary
assessment mission prior to the initiation of programme planning as has
increasingly been the case in recent years. Assessments should be undertaken
in consultation with all relevant in-country parties to determine the nature and
general scope of the problem including its socio-economic implications, the
resources available at the local and national level which can be drawn upon to
reduce vulnerability, and the factors which are likely to affect the launching of
the programme.
Clause on Landmines in Peace Agreements
16. The UN focal point should take a proactive approach and promote the
inclusion of an appropriate clause on landmines in peace agreements. Such a
clause would, for example, stipulate that parties to the conflict must desist from
using mines, that they undertake to make available information on minefield and
patterns of mine use, and facilitate in every way possible humanitarian mine
action activities.
Use of Voluntary and Assessed Contributions
17. The Mine Action Centre and operational activities should be funded by the
government and voluntary contributions. Assessed budget funds from peacekeeping missions should be utilized solely for “operational demining” under the
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control of the peace-keeping forces until such time as the UN reforms its
accounting and accountability procedures.

Tripartite Agreements
18. Donor nations that choose to fund NGOs and commercial entities
directly should do so through a tripartite agreement involving the donor,
the implementing agency, and the Mine Action Centre. This will facilitate
coordination and ensure adherence to standards.

Financial Tracking
19. Given the importance of a better understanding of expenditure on
mine action programmes, the UN focal point should work with donors
and country programmes to develop a simple and reliable system of
financial tracking.

Financial and Administration
20. Mine action is too important to be held hostage to procurement and
recruitment delays dictated by out-dated and inappropriate rules and
regulations. Mine Action Centres need maximum authority delegated to
the field, particularly in the Planning and Initiation phases. In
consultation with the relevant authorities, expedited field procedures
must be introduced by the UN. If it is unable to do so, the UN should
acknowledge its ineffectiveness and find another institutional home for
the development of mine action activities. During the critical early
phases, before donors have confidence in newly formed Mine Action
Centres, the UN must find ways to mobilize funds and establish a project
document and budget. The UN must appoint a Programme Manager
with delegated authority to procure and recruit within the project
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document and its budget. Qualified Admin and Finance staff should be
available from the very beginning of MAC activities.

Quality Control, Monitoring, Evaluations
21. The Mine Action Centre should establish a quality control unit to continually
assess staff performance in the field to ensure that field activities are
undertaken in line with the highest standards appropriate to humanitarian mine
action. Remedial training should take place when problems are identified.
22. The Mine Action Centre should regularly conduct monitoring missions to the
field composed of MAC staff, donor representatives, and relevant UN agencies
and other concerned actors as appropriate. The reports of these missions
should be forwarded directly to the Director of the MAC.
23. The mine action authority, in consultation with major donors, should
regularly contract a competent outside agency to conduct a thorough evaluation
of all aspects of the mine action programme including financial, management
and operational activities. This evaluation should take place roughly every two
years and should include a team member identified by the UN focal point to
facilitate continuity and exchange of information between programmes.
Programme Profile
24. The profile and range of field operational activities should be the result of a
multi-disciplinary assessment of the minefield threat and should be based on a
thorough review of available resources including different technologies and
capabilities which are available in-country or elsewhere.
25. The Programme Manager of the MAC should pursue a needs-driven and
proactive response in the orchestration of field operational activities. This
means that whether the MAC is directly responsible for the development and
implementation of field activities, or whether operational activities are carried
out under contract to the MAC, resources must be allocated in a manner which
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ensures priorities are met and demining teams are not sitting idle because
communication and logistics infrastructure are not yet available.
Mine Awareness
26. All programme planners and managers should take a proactive approach to
mine awareness and ensure that it is an integral component of a
comprehensive mine action programme. All mine awareness activities should
be coordinated with UNICEF and the MAC.

Prioritisation
27. Programme Managers of Mine Action Centres should develop and
establish processes to enable prioritisation of minefield clearance and
survey tasks. Prioritisation should be developed with the advice and
expertise of personnel familiar with rural development and social issues
in affected communities.

Training
28. Training programmes should be designed as inherent components of
building an indigenous capacity. Greater attention must be given to the
development of administrative and management skills as well as to
specializations such as surveying and data management. Whenever expatriate
personnel are used in training and advisory functions, national counterparts
should be available and given maximum on-the-job training.
29. Programme planning should ensure that training timetables are in synch
with operational objectives.
30. The Mine Action Centre should take a proactive role in (a) coordinating the
organization of training facilities for all in-country teams as appropriate and (b)
in the development of a standardized training curricula; it should monitor all
training initiatives with a view to ensuring that all graduates meet basic
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minimum standards.
31. The MAC should take a proactive role in ensuring that expatriate Technical
Advisers have appropriate qualifications and skills needed for the task of
training and transfer of knowledge. Similarly, an effort must be made to avoid
the rapid turnover of personnel involved in training activities. All such personnel
should be available for a minimum of 12 months and, preferably, for 24 months.
Standard Operating Procedures
32. Agreed Standard Operating Procedures must form the methodological basis
for the conduct of mine action activities. Mine Action Centres should ensure
that all agencies operate according to accepted SOPs. SOPs used in
humanitarian mine action activities must reflect the humanitarian nature of the
intervention and will differ significantly from SOPs developed for military or
commercial mine and UXO clearance. Endorsement of approved SOPs and
enforcement of these must be seen as a basic coordination and regulatory
function of the Mine Action Centre.
Operational Safety
33. All accidents occurring during minefield mapping, marking and clearance or
in areas declared free of mines must be fully investigated. The MAC should
compile and circulate the results of accident investigations and ensure that all
operators and commercial agencies circulate information concerning
accidents.
34. The MAC should establish a Board of Enquiry to oversee the investigation
of all accidents. The Board should, in terms of its membership, draw together
appropriate personnel so that objective investigations are undertaken if and
when the MAC itself sustains accidents.
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35. The issue of protective clothing should be further examined and
modifications, as appropriate, reflected in the international standards set out in
the document “International Standards for Mine Clearance Operations”.
Remuneration Levels
36. Programme Managers should carefully consider salary levels both in terms
of sustainability and the appropriateness of the expertise being provided. The
Mine Action Centre should set standard conditions of employment for all
organizations operating within the country programme.
Productivity, Research and Development
37. The UN should take a more proactive role in helping Mine Action Centres
collect, analyse and document empirical data on the productivity levels of
different methodologies in different conditions. This should be seen as an
important planning and evaluation tool. The UN should also take a proactive
role in developing indicators and criteria useful for measuring overall
productivity levels.
38. The UN should facilitate information sharing as a routine task between
programmes and relevant actors and help ensure an effective dialogue between
programme managers and research and development work.
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The diagram depicts the general
responsibilities for mine action in Lebanon
and the inter-relationships between the
various actors: The Government of
Lebanon has overall responsibility and
exercises this through a central
coordinating authority, NDO. The
Lebanese Army, utilising the skills of the
Army engineers conducts the physical
clearance activities as well as Mine
Awareness in conjunction with the NDO
and NGOs. The UN System supports the
Government and the NDO through its
various agencies and coordinates with
Donors through the International Support
Group (ISG). The TWG provides a
mechanism to develop acceptable standards
and procedures among the various
operational actors in the functional fields.
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WHO
UNICEF
LMRC Landmines Resource Centre
WRF World Rehabilitation Fund
NATIONAL NGOs
NORWEGIAN PEOPLES AID
UNIFIL
LEBANESE RED CROSS
CIVIL SOCIETY

SURVEYS/DATA
COLLECTION

INTERNATIONAL
SUPPORT GROUP

DONORS

NDO
LEBANESE ARMY
UNDP
LMRC Landmines Resource Centre
MAG (UK)
UNFIL
UNMAS/MACC
SURVEY ACTION CENTER
WRF World Rehabilitation Fund)
CIVIL SOCIETY

TECHNICAL
WORKING GROUPS
VICTIM ASSISTANCE

NDO

OF

GOVERNMENT

E-12

SYSTEM

UNITED NATIONS

LEBANESE ARMY
NDO
UNIFIL
INTERNATIONAL NGOs
NATIONAL NGOs
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
BI-LATERAL ASSISTANCE
MACC

MINE/UXO CLEARANCE

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS – ACCREDITATION – REGISTRATION - QUALITY ASSURANCE - CERTFICATION

NDO
LEBANESE ARMY
UNICEF
UNESCO
LMRC Landmines Resource Centre
WRF World Rehabilitation Fund
NATIONAL NGOs
SAVE THE CHILDREN SWEDEN
UNIFIL
LEBANESE RED CROSS
CIVIL SOCIETY

MINE AWARENESS

LEBANESE
ARMY

This chart shows the main
functional areas of mine action
and identifies the actors as of
May 2001. It is important to
note the linkages from the NDO,
with support from the UN
h

FUNCTIONAL GROUPINGS OF KEY ACTORS IN MINE ACTION
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